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Culpa in Contrahendo in European
Private International Law: Another
Look at Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation
By Najib Hage-Chahine*
Abstract: Precontractual liability is liability that arises out of a harmful conduct
that occurs during the formation period of a contract. Where the harmful
conduct occurs during international negotiations, a conflict of laws issue arises.
The determination of the applicable law to precontractual liability can be a
complex and tedious task, which is why the European Legislature has provided
a special conflict-of-law rule in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation on the
applicable law to non-contractual obligations. Through this provision, the
European Legislature aims to achieve uniformity between EU Member States,
while providing an appropriate conflicts rule. The present essay assesses the
European Legislature’s attempt at codification and offers a commentary of
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. It comes at a time when the Commission is
scheduled to submit a report on the application of the Rome II Regulation to the
European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social
Committee. This essay will show that the Legislature has displaced the
traditional rules of European private international law by adopting a
contractual connecting factor in order to determine the applicable law to a noncontractual obligation. Indeed, the European Legislature has, for the purposes
of European private international law, chosen to characterize culpa in
contrahendo as non-contractual, but has chosen to determine the applicable law
to this non-contractual obligation on the basis of a contractual connecting
factor. Thus, Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has, in fact, chosen to
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in
negotio. According to this provision, the applicable law to claims arising out of
culpa in contrahendo is the law of the contract that was under negotiation. In
spite of its advantages, the rule provided by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation
lacks flexibility. The lack of escape devices and the relative inapplicability of
the second paragraph of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation make this rule a
rigid one whose application cannot be displaced whenever it reaches
inappropriate results.
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INTRODUCTION
Precontractual liability is liability that arises out of a harmful conduct
that occurs during the formation period of a contract. 1 Although the effect
1
On precontractual liability, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217,
221 (1987); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007); John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual
Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation in International Transactions, 17 HOUS. J.
INT‘L L. 1 (1994); Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and
Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97 (1997); Raymond Saleilles, De la
responsabilité précontractuelle, 6 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR.
CIV.] 697 (1907); Joanna Schmidt, La sanction de la faute précontractuelle, 73 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.] 46 (1974); PRECONTRACTUAL
LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, INT‘L ACAD. OF COMP. LAW, MONTREAL,
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of the harm might be felt subsequently to the formation of the contract, the
cause of harm is, in principle, temporally situated prior to the conclusion of
the contract.2 The adjective ―precontractual‖ indicates that this type of
liability is linked to the period that precedes the formation of the contract.
Where the harmful conduct occurs during the international
negotiations of a contract, a conflict of laws issue arises. This is the case,
for example, in the following four situations.
Example 1: Defendant, a U.S. resident, sells his shares in a French
company to a French plaintiff. The defendant fails, at the time the contract
for the sale of shares is concluded, to disclose to the French plaintiff that the
company will stop doing business in the United States. The plaintiff files a
suit for damages in France for breach of the precontractual duty to disclose
material facts during the conclusion of the contract. This claim raises the
issue of determining the law that governs the defendant‘s liability.
According to French law, 3 the defendant is liable for failure to disclose
material facts that affect the determination of the shares‘ value.4 On the
other hand, according to U.S. law,5 the principle of caveat emptor will most
likely apply and exonerate the defendant. 6
Example 2: Defendant, a German resident, offers to buy all the shares
of a French plaintiff in an English company. Before a reasonable time has
elapsed, the defendant revokes his offer in a letter dispatched in Germany
and received in France, where the plaintiff resides. The latter disregards the
revocation letter and dispatches his acceptance to the defendant. Having
not received an answer, the plaintiff files a suit where he seeks, first to
establish the existence of the contract by claiming that he has accepted the
offer within a reasonable time, and, alternatively, to obtain damages for
unlawful revocation of a binding offer. This case raises two conflict-oflaws issues: the issue of the existence of the contract and the issue of the
defendant‘s precontractual liability. According to German law, 7 the

CANADA 18–24 AUGUST, 1990 (Ewoud H. Hondius, ed.,
1991) [hereinafter
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS].
2
However, we will see that one exceptional situation gives rise to precontractual liability
that stems from a harmful conduct that occurs after the negotiations have ended. See infra
Part I(B)(2)(b).
3
France is the place of residence of the plaintiff. It is also the place where the company
whose shares are the subject matter of the contract is situated. It might also be argued that
this is the place where the injury has manifested itself.
4
See FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 233 (2009).
5
The U.S. is the place of residence of the defendant. It might also be argued that this is
the place where the harmful conduct has manifested itself.
6
See ANDREW STILTON, SALE OF SHARES AND BUSINESSES: LAW, PRACTICE &
AGREEMENTS 133 (2d ed. 2006).
7
Germany is the place of residence of the defendant. It might also be argued that it is the
place where the conduct occurs, since it is the place where the decision to revoke the offer
was made.
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defendant is bound by his offer and cannot freely revoke it before a
reasonable time has passed.8 In effect, the plaintiff has effectively accepted
the offer and the contract for the sale of shares is formed. Because the
defendant is bound by the sale contract, he does not incur any
precontractual liability under German rules. According to French law, 9 the
defendant must hold the offer for a reasonable time before he can retract
it.10 However, under French law the revocation of the offer prevents the
contract from coming into existence and the defendant‘s conduct can only
give rise to damages. 11 Finally, according to U.K.12 law, the defendant can,
in principle, freely revoke his offer without incurring liability. 13
Example 3: Plaintiff, a French resident, started negotiations with a
U.K. defendant for the sale of goods by the French party to the U.K. party.
After several weeks of negotiations, the U.K. party abruptly breaks off
negotiations. Having incurred costs during the negotiations period, the
French party files a claim against the U.K. party in France in order to get
compensated for his expenses. The issue is whether French law, 14 which
awards damages in the event negotiations are broken off in bad faith, 15
should apply or whether U.K. law, which does not impose a precontractual

8

BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug.
18,
1896,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 42, as amended, § 145 (Ger.) and § 147(2).
9
France is the place of residence of the plaintiff. . It is also, arguably, the place where
economic injury arise. It might also be argued that is the place where the conduct occurs,
since the decision to revoke the offer is received there.
10
See, e.g., Cass. 3e civ., June 4, 2009, Bull. civ. III, No. 118, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITE
XT000020656565&fastReqId=523728088&fastPos=1.
11
The French position on the matter is not very clear. While many authors argue for the
forced conclusion of the contract whenever the offer was prematurely retracted, the French
Cour de Cassation has only awarded damages on the basis of the unlawful revocation of the
offer, and has yet to force the conclusion of the contract whenever the plaintiff has accepted
the offer after its revocation. On the French position, see TERRÉ ET AL, supra note 4, at 117;
Patrick Chauvel, Consentement, D. 2007, ¶ 135; YVAINE BUFFELAN-LANORE & VIRGINIE
LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 745 (12th ed., 2010). On liability
arising out of the revocation of the offer in Europe, see Catherine Delforge, La formation
des contrats sous un angle dynamique—Réflexions comparatives, in LE PROCESSUS DE
FORMATION DU CONTRAT: CONTRIBUTIONS COMPARATIVES ET INTERDISCIPLINAIRES À
L‘HARMONISATION DU DROIT EUROPÉEN 139 (Marcel Fontaine, ed. 2002).
12
The U.K. is the place where the company whose shares are the subject matter of the
contemplated contract is situated.
13
Under U.K. law, the offer is not binding unless it is contained in an option contract.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir,
trans., 1998).
14
France is the place of residence of the plaintiff, and, arguably the place where
economic injury arises. It might also be argued that it is the place where the harmful conduct
occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is received in France.
15
See Chambre commerciale et financière [Cass. Com.] [Commercial and financial
court], Apr. 22 1997, D. 1998, 45, note Patrick Chauvel (Fr.).
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duty of good faith during negotiations, 16 should govern the situation, thus
exonerating the defendant from liability.
Example 4: Plaintiff, a U.K. resident, started negotiations with an U.S.
defendant for the sale of land owned by the U.S. defendant in Germany.
After several weeks of negotiations, the American party abruptly breaks off
negotiations in a letter dispatched in the United States and received in the
U.K. Having incurred costs during the negotiations period, the U.K. party
files a claim against the U.S. party in the U.K. in order to receive
compensation for his expenses. This claim raises the issue of the
determination of the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual
liability. According to German law, 17 the plaintiff is entitled to damages in
the event negotiations are broken off in bad faith. 18 However, U.S. 19 and
U.K.20 laws do not, in principle, impose a precontractual duty of good faith
during negotiations,21 thereby exonerating the defendant from liability.
The determination of the law that governs the defendant‘s
precontractual liability in each of the above-mentioned scenarios encounters
two difficulties. First, the determination of the applicable law to
precontractual liability is hindered by the difficulty of characterizing this
type of liability. Indeed, precontractual liability is subject to several
possible characterizations in the different E.U. Member States. 22 While it

16

Stathis Banakas, Liability for Contractual Negotiations in English Law: Looking for
the Litmus Test, INDRET 1 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.indret.com/pdf/605_en_1.pdf;
Alberto M. Musy, The Good Faith Principle in Contract Law and the Precontractual Duty
to Disclose: Comparative Analysis of New Differences in Legal Cultures, 1 GLOBAL J URIST
ADVANCES 1, 1, 10 (2001).
17
Germany is the place where the property is situated.
18
See Musy, supra note 16, at 5.
19
The U.S. is the place of residence of the defendant. It might also be argued that it is
the place where the conduct occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is made and
dispatched to the plaintiff from the U.S.
20
The U.K. is the place of residence of the plaintiff. It is also, arguably the place where
economic injury arises. It might also be argued that it is the place where the harmful conduct
occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is received in the U.K.
21
For American Law, see Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass.
509, 517 (1998); F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815 (1st Cir. 1996); see also STEVEN J.
BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE,
BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 330 (1995) (stating that ―American law imposes no general duty to
negotiate a contract in good faith‖). For U.K. law, see Banakas, supra note 16, at 1; Musy,
supra note 16; Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16, 38
(1956).
22
RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 730 (3d ed. 2009). On the various possible characterizations of
precontractual liability in Europe, see Dário Moura Vicente, Precontractual Liability in
Private International Law: A Potuguese Perspective, 67 Rabels Zeitschrift Für
Ausländisches Und Internationales Privatrecht [Rabel Journal for Foreign and International
Private Law] [RabelZ] 699, 710–16 (2003); Nedzel, supra note 1, at 97; Ioanna Thoma,
Culpa in Contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation, 61 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT‘L
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has been characterized as contractual by some jurisdictions, 23 it has been
characterized as tortious, 24 or even ―as an independent kind of liability
deriving its force and effect from the law‖25 by others. Some jurisdictions,
such as Portugal, even adopt a hybrid characterization where, in some
instances, precontractual liability can be characterized as contractual while
in others it can be considered as tortious.26 The uncertainty accompanying
the characterization of precontractual liability hinders uniformity by
producing divergent results depending on which characterization is adopted.
Because characterization determines the conflict-of-law rule that designates
the applicable law, 27 the divergent characterizations of precontractual
liability lead to the application of divergent laws in the different Member
States. This would be the case, for example, in the scenario described by D.
Moura Vicente, where ―negotiations for the conclusion of a sale contract
break down in France and the prospective seller is a German resident.‖28 In
this case, ―French and German law would potentially apply to the
precontractual liability arising from these facts.‖29 Indeed, the situation is
characterized as tortious in France, which means that the application of the
French conflict-of-law rule designates French law as the applicable lex
delicti.30 However, because the situation is characterized as contractual in
Germany, the application of the German conflict-of-law rule leads to the
application of German law to the defendant‘s precontractual liability. 31 ―A
concurrence of applicable rules would thus occur,‖32 leading to divergent
results in the different member states.
Second, the determination of the applicable law to precontractual
liability is hindered by the difficulty of determining the relevant contacts in
a situation involving precontractual liability. 33 This is especially true for
the place of injury, the place of conduct, the place where the parties‘
[R.H.D.I.] 669, 674 (2008); PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH
CONGRESS, supra note 1.
23
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 12.
24
This is the case, for example, in France. See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46;
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 11.
25
This is the case, for example, in Greece. See Thoma, supra note 25, at 674.
26
See Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716.
27
On the issue of characterization, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification,
Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743
(1941); Fowler V. Harper, Torts, Contracts, Property, Status, Characterization, and the
Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (1959).
28
Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716.
29
Id.
30
Id.; see also, Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46.
31
Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716.
32
Id.
33
On these difficulties, see Paul Lagarde, La culpa in contrahendo à la croisée des
règlements communautaires, in NEW INSTRUMENTS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIBER
FAUSTO POCAR 584, 590 (Giuffré 2009).
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precontractual relationship was centered, and the place where the parties‘
contemplated contractual relationship is centered.
 The determination of the place of injury is complicated by the
economic nature of the loss that arises out of the defendant‘s conduct.34
 The place where the harmful conduct occurred is hard to determine
because of the type of conduct that causes injury, and because negotiations
are usually conducted in the absence of the physical presence of the parties.
This is the case, for example, whenever liability arises out of a decision to
break off negotiations that is made and dispatched by the defendant in one
place and received by the plaintiff in another. 35
 The place where the parties‘ precontractual relationship is centered is
hard to determine whenever negotiations are conducted in the absence of
the physical presence of the parties—through the telephone or via email. 36
 The determination of the place where the parties‘ contemplated
contractual relationship is centered can be hard to determine whenever
negotiations did not lead to the conclusion of the contract. In this case, the
place where the contract under negotiation would have been concluded and
the place where the contract under negotiation would have been performed
can be hard to determine.
The difficulties accompanying the determination of the law that
governs precontractual liability have prompted the European Legislature to
adopt a special conflict-of-law rule in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation
on the applicable law to non-contractual obligations. 37 This Regulation
falls in line with the European Union‘s movement of unifying European
private international law. Along with the Rome I Regulation on the
applicable law to contractual obligations, 38 the European Union seeks to
achieve uniformity in the realm of private international law of obligations
amongst the Member States. While the Rome I Regulation determines the
applicable law to contractual obligations, the Rome II Regulation provides
the applicable law to claims involving non-contractual obligations.
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to noncontractual obligations provides the choice of law rule dealing with culpa in
contrahendo,39 which is the category that encompasses non-contractual

34

See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(ii).
See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(i).
36
See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(iii).
37
Council Regulation 864/2007, art. 12, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 45 (EU).
38
Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU).
39
The notion of culpa in contrahendo was first used by German scholar Rudolf von
Jhering to designate fault during the conclusion of a contract. See Rudolf Von Jhering, De la
culpa in contrahendo ou des dommages intérêts dans les conventions nulles ou restées
imparfaites, in ŒUVRES CHOISIES VOL. II 1 (O. de Meulenaere, trans., 1893).
35
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types of precontractual liability. We will see that the concept of culpa in
contrahendo, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation,
is narrower than the concept of precontractual liability. While the latter
encompasses a wide array of cases involving liability that arises out of a
party‘s conduct during the negotiation of a contract, 40 the former only
encompasses certain types of non-contractual liability claims arising out of
precontractual dealings.41
By its placement under Chapter III of the Rome II Regulation, Article
12 has inherited the Regulation‘s three main features. First, this provision
is binding in all member countries ―without the need for implementing
national legislation in each individual country.‖42 In other words, its
application is mandatory in all member countries. 43
Second, this provision benefits from universal applicability, which
means two things. First, its application ―is not dependent on any link with
the European Community or any of the Member States, [aside] from the
situation being litigated before a court of one of the Member States.‖44
Second, it is applicable even though the designated law might not be the
law of a Member State. According to Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation,
―[a]ny law specified by this Regulation shall apply whether or not it is the
law of a Member State.‖45 It follows that the Regulation will cover
situations ―occurring both within and outside the Union, which may lead to
the application of the law of a non-Member State.‖46 Third, the concepts
used by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation have an autonomous meaning
that is to be interpreted consistently with other EU instruments and with
ECJ case law.47 This autonomy ―is essential to ensure the consistent
interpretation [of the Regulation] throughout the European Community.‖48

40

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I(B).
42
Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 173, 174 (2008).
43
According to the closing sentence of the Rome II Regulation: ―[t]his Regulation shall
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the
Treaty establishing the European Community.‖ Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note
37, closing sentence.
44
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 465. However, it should be noted that the
fact that the case is being litigated in a Member State means that the situation has at least
some connection with the European Community.
45
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 3.
46
Symeonides, supra note 42, at 174.
47
See infra Part I(B).
48
ANDREW DICKINSON, THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NONCONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 120 (2010). See also Cyril Nourissat, Le champ d’application
du règlement « Rome II », in LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II » SUR LA LOI
APPLICABLE AUX OBLIGATIONS NON CONTRACTUELLES 19 (Sabine Corneloup & Natalie
Joubert eds., 2008) [hereinafter LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II »].
41
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A. History Behind The Adoption Of Article 12 Of The Rome II
Regulation49
The first suggestion of a conflict-of-law rule for claims arising out of
precontractual dealings came from an informal group of private
international law experts: the European Group of Private International Law
(EGPIL).50 This idea was initially suggested in the explanatory documents
of the Group‘s proposal for a European Convention on the Law Applicable
to Non-Contractual Obligations adopted at the Group‘s meeting in 1998.51
This initial suggestion was followed by the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign Private and Private International Law‘s proposal to include a
conflict-of-law rule for claims arising out of precontractual liability in its
Comments on the European Commission‘s Green Paper on the conversion
of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual
obligations.52 In July 2003, the Commission provided its first draft
proposal for the Rome II Regulation where culpa in contrahendo appeared
―as an example of non-contractual, [but] non-delictual instances.‖53 It was
subsequently ignored in the Commission‘s modified proposal54 until it
resurfaced again in the text of the Common Position, 55 and was adopted by
the Council in 2006.56 Finally, the conflict-of-law rule on culpa in
contrahendo was adopted in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law
49
For more on this issue, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 670; Bart Volders, Culpa in
Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A Commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation, 9 Y.B. PRIVATE INT‘L L. 127, 129 (2007) [hereinafter Volders, Commentary];
Bart Volders, Culpa in Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A First Appraisal of Article 12
of the Rome II Regulation, 2008.4 NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 464, 465
(2008) [hereinafter Volders, First Appraisal].
50
Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70, Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465.
51
Thoma, supra note 22, at 669; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465. For the
text of this proposal, see Proposal for a European Convention on the Law Applicable to
Non-contractual Obligations, EUROPEAN GROUP FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
http://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-8pe.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
52
Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465; see
also J. BASEDOW ET AL., MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE AND PRIVATE INTL. LAW,
COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION‘S GREEN PAPER ON THE CONVERSION OF THE
ROME CONVENTION OF 1980 ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS INTO A
COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT AND ITS MODERNIZATION 96, 105, 114 (2003) [hereinafter MAX
PLANCK INST., COMMENTS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/
rome_i/contributions/max_planck_institute_foreign_private_international_law_en.pdf.
In
particular, Article 8.2 of the Proposal which states that ―[l]egal consequences resulting from
the breaking-off of negotiations shall be governed by the law which would govern the
contemplated contract.‖ Id. at 114.
53
Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70.
54
Id.
55
The Common Position is a legal instrument by which the Council defines the Union‘s
approach to a particular matter.
56
See Council Common Position 22/2006 2006 O.J. (C 289E) 68 (EC).
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applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).57 Pursuant to Article
32,58 the Rome II Regulation went into effect on January 11, 2009, with the
consequence that the Regulation will apply ―only to events giving rise to
damage [occurring after that date] and that the date on which the
proceedings seeking compensation for damage were brought or the date on
which the applicable law was determined by the court seised have no
bearing on determining the scope ratione temporis of the Regulation.‖59
B. Structure Of The Provision
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides a special rule that
determines the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo. The European
Legislature has decided that the general rule provided by Article 4 of the
Rome II Regulation60 in order to determine the applicable law to noncontractual obligations is inappropriate for determining the applicable law
to precontractual liability.61 The Legislature has, therefore, provided for a
more specific rule that is more suitable in this particular case. 62 In effect,
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation has been placed in a separate chapter
that provides special rules for situations that encompass non-contractual
obligations arising from unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in

57

Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37.
Id. art. 32.
Case C-412/10, Homawoo v. GMF Assurances, 2011 E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 37.
Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation states:

58
59
60

1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in
which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise
to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the
indirect consequences of that event occur.
2. However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining
damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the
damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply.
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer
connection with another country might be based in particular on a preexisting
relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with
the tort/delict in question.
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 4.
61
According to Recital 19 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[s]pecific rules should be laid
down for special torts/delicts where the general rule does not allow a reasonable balance to
be struck between the interests at stake.‖ Id. at para. 19.
62
According to Recital 29 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[p]rovision should be made for
special rules where damage is caused by an act other than a tort/delict, such as unjust
enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo.‖ Id. at para. 29.
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contrahendo.63
According to Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation:
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether
the contract was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that
applies to the contract or that would have been applicable to it had it
been entered into.
2. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of
paragraph 1, it shall be:
(a) the law of the country in which the damage occurs,
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the
damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in
which the indirect consequences of that event occurred; or
(b) where the parties have their habitual residence in the same
country at the time when the event giving rise to the damage
occurs, the law of that country; or
(c) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that
the non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to
the conclusion of a contract is manifestly more closely
connected with a country other than that indicated in points (a)
and (b), the law of that other country. 64

Close examination of this provision reveals that the European
Legislature has, in the area of precontractual liability, chosen to depart from
the traditional rules of private international law in Europe. Conflicts of
laws in Europe are traditionally resolved by relying upon a two-step process
that requires courts to characterize the issue before implementing the
conflict-of-law rule that designates the applicable law. First, the courts
must characterize the issue. Upon characterization, the issue will be
inserted into a private international law category (i.e. torts, contracts,
marriage, successions, property, etc). Second, the courts will apply the
conflict-of-law rule that is assigned to the category to which the issue
belongs. Each private international law category is assigned a
predetermined connecting factor that determines the applicable law
whenever the dispute falls within this category. In effect, each private
international law category has its own law whose application is triggered
whenever the dispute falls within this category. Thus, the category of torts
63
Cf. Gérard Légier, Enrichissement sans cause, gestion d’affaires et culpa in
contrahendo, in LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II », supra note 48, at 145;
Caroline Tubeuf, Enrichissement sans cause, gestion d’affaires et ―culpa in contrahendo,‖
114 REVUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 535 (2008).
64
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37.
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is usually governed by the lex delicti—which, according to Article 4 of the
Rome II Regulation, is the law of the place of injury65—while the category
of ―contracts‖ is usually governed by the lex contractus—which is
determined according to the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation. 66
In adopting Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, the European
Legislature has chosen to depart from this tradition. Indeed, the European
Legislature, which has opted in favor of a non-contractual characterization
of culpa in contrahendo in European Private International Law (EPIL), has
in fact chosen a contractual connecting factor in order to determine the
applicable law. Instead of choosing to submit this category to the lex
delicti, which is the general rule applicable in cases of non-contractual
liability, the Legislature has chosen to submit this category to the law of the
contract under negotiation.67
The present essay offers a two-part commentary of Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation, and comes at a time when the Commission has
scheduled to submit a report on the application of the Rome II Regulation to
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and
Social Committee. The submission of such a report was first provided for
by Article 30(1) of the Rome II Regulation. According to this provision, a
report on the application of the Rome II Regulation was to have been
submitted by the Commission, no later than August 2011. The report was
to have been accompanied, if necessary, by proposals to adapt the Rome II
Regulation and was to include
a study on the effects of the way in which foreign law is treated in
the different jurisdictions and on the extent to which courts in the
Member States apply foreign law in practice pursuant to this
Regulation; [and] a study on the effects of Article 28 of this
Regulation with respect to the Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on
the law applicable to traffic accidents.68

65

Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 4.
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38.
67
Cf. Sylvain Bollée, A la croisée des règlements Rome I et Rome II: la rupture des
négociations contractuelles, 31 D. 2008, 2161. This author states that there is a ―union‖
between the two laws. See infra Part II(A).
68
Article 30(1) of the Rome II Regulation states that:
66

1. Not later than 20 August 2011, the Commission shall submit to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a
report on the application of this Regulation. If necessary, the report shall be
accompanied by proposals to adapt this Regulation. The report shall include:
(i) a study on the effects of the way in which foreign law is treated in the
different jurisdictions and on the extent to which courts in the Member States
apply foreign law in practice pursuant to this Regulation;
(ii) a study on the effects of Article 28 of this Regulation with respect to the
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In its Application Plan to Implement the Stockholm Programme, the
Commission postponed the submission of this report to 2012.69 The present
essay provides another look at the Legislature‘s attempt to provide a
conflict-of-law rule in the realm of precontractual liability70 in the hope that
some of the uncertainties that accompany the implementation of this rule
will be addressed in the upcoming report.
Part I of this essay will discuss the non-contractual characterization of
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation.
Through this
characterization, the European Legislature has aimed to put an end to the
characterization debate of precontractual liability in the different Member
States.71 Part I(A) of this essay will show that the non-contractual
characterization of culpa in contrahendo aims to achieve uniformity
between the European instruments on Private International law, and falls in
line with the ECJ case law on jurisdiction, as well as with the Rome I
Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations. Part I(B) of
this essay will show that the Legislature has intended for culpa in
contrahendo to have an autonomous meaning that is not to be necessarily
interpreted within the meaning of national law. Part I(B) will show that
only certain claims arising out of precontractual dealings fall within the
material scope of culpa in contrahendo.
Part II of this essay will discuss the contractual connecting factor of
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation. Part II(A) will discuss the
general rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. This part
will show that Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has submitted claims
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the law of the contract under
negotiation or the lex contractus in negotio. Depending on whether the
contract under negotiation has been concluded or not, the lex contractus in
negotio is one of two laws. In the first situation, the law that governs the
concluded contract also governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability. In
this case, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus finalis or the
law of the definitive contract. In the event the contract was not concluded,

Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents.
Article 30(1) of Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12.
69
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering an
area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens, Action Plan Implementing the
Stockholm Programme, at 25 COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF.
70
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation was the subject of several commentaries in
Europe, see most notably: Bollée, supra note 67; DICKINSON, supra note 48, ch. 12; Lagarde,
supra note 33; Légier supra note 63; PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, ch. 26; Thoma,
supra note 22; Tubeuf supra note 63; Volders, Commentary, supra note 49; Volders, First
Appraisal, supra note 49.
71
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 730.
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the law of the contract whose conclusion was contemplated by the parties
during their negotiations governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability.
In this case, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus putativus or
the law of the putative contract. Part II(A) will also offer an appraisal of the
application of the lex contractus in negotio after pinpointing the difficulties
that accompany the determination of the lex contractus in negotio. These
difficulties stem from the application of a contractual connecting factor to a
non-contractual situation.
Part II(B) of this essay will discuss the subsidiary connecting factors
provided by Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation. This part will show
that the application requirement of Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation
can rarely be met, thus rendering the application of Article 12(1) quasiexclusive.
I. THE NON-CONTRACTUAL CHARACTERIZATION OF CULPA IN
CONTRAHENDO IN EPIL
Conflicts of laws in Europe are traditionally resolved by using a twostep process that requires courts to characterize the issue before
implementing the conflict-of-law rule that designates the applicable law.72
Characterization is, therefore, the first step that a European jurist should
take before attempting to resolve a conflict of laws issue. 73 Unlike the
United States‘ pragmatic approach to conflicts,74 EPIL places a strong
emphasis on characterization in order to determine the relevant contact that
will, in turn, determine the applicable law. 75 By adopting a special rule for
precontractual liability, the European Legislature intended, at least for EPIL
purposes, to put an end to the characterization debate of precontractual
liability in Europe.76 This debate stems from the various categories in
which national jurisdictions of member states include precontractual
liability.77 The differences in characterization between the different member
states ruin uniformity and might lead, in the same situation, to the
application of different laws.78

72

See supra notes 64–66, and accompanying text.
Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465.
74
The pragmatic approach to conflict of laws is ―a method of choice-of-law analysis that
integrates the important elements of the various modern policy-oriented approaches to
conflicts law . . . .What is unique about the method advocated here is the insistence on
generating arguments on both sides before reaching any conclusions about the proper
outcome.‖ Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U.L. REV. 731, 818
(1990).
75
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
76
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 730; Bollée, supra note 67; Thoma, supra
note 22; Tubeuf, supra note 63.
77
See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
78
See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
73
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By inserting a provision on culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II
Regulation, the European Legislature has chosen to characterize this type of
liability as non-contractual.
The non-contractual characterization of culpa in contrahendo raises
two issues.
The first issue is to determine whether the European Legislature has
chosen to characterize all types of precontractual liability in EPIL as noncontractual. According to the European Court of Justice, there are two
types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a contractual type of
precontractual liability and a non-contractual type of precontractual
liability.79 The issue is whether the newly adopted provisions on
precontractual liability in the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations deviate
from the ECJ case law or if, on the contrary, these provisions fall in line
with the ECJ case law. 80 Part I(A) will show that the European Legislature
has chosen to be consistent with the ECJ case law and has adopted a
uniform characterization of culpa in contrahendo in European Private
International Law.
The second issue is to determine the type of claims that are
characterized as culpa in contrahendo in order to trigger the application of
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. Part I(B) will show that the European
Legislature has conferred upon culpa in contrahendo an autonomous
meaning, which, according to recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation,81 is not
necessarily interpreted within the meaning of national laws. 82 This means
that the contours of the category of culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II
Regulation should be determined in accordance with the ECJ case law as
well as with the regulatory provisions of the European instruments on
private international law, and should not vary according to the national
views of each member state. 83
79

See infra Part I(A)(1).
See PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544;
Thoma, supra note 22, at 678; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
81
Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation states
80

Culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an autonomous
concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within the meaning of national
law. It should include the violation of the duty of disclosure and the breakdown of
contractual negotiations. Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations
presenting a direct link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. This
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers personal injury,
Article 4 or other relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply.
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para 30.
82
DICKINSON, supra note 48 at 525; Légier, supra note 63, at 148; PLENDER &
WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 729; Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at
540; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
83
Thoma, supra note 22, at 676.
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A. The Uniform Characterization of Culpa in Contrahendo
By inserting a provision on the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo
in the Rome II Regulation, the European Legislature has sought to achieve
uniformity between the sources of private international law in the European
Union.
Indeed, the non-contractual characterization of culpa in
contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation falls in line with the ECJ case law
on jurisdiction, as well as with the Rome I Regulation on the applicable law
to contractual obligations.
1. The ECJ Case Law on Jurisdiction
The non-contractual characterization of precontractual liability in the
Rome II Regulation falls in line with the ECJ case law on the Brussels
Convention of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968 Brussels Convention). 84
In its Tacconi judgment of September 17, 2002,85 the ECJ has expressly
characterized precontractual liability arising out of the unjustified breaking
off of negotiations as a non-contractual type of liability. In this case, the
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation) referred
to the ECJ a question concerning the interpretation of Article 2, 86 the first
subparagraph of Article 5(1),87 and Article 5(3)88 of the 1968 Brussels

84

Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968 [hereinafter 1968 Brussels Convention]. This
convention has been replaced by the Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters. This regulation governs the jurisdiction of courts of Member States in civil and
commercial matters, as well as the rules governing the recognition of foreign judgments in
member states. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 12/1) 1 (EC).
85
Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto
Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 2002 E.C.R., I-7357, I-7396.
86
Article 2 of the 1968 Brussels Convention states that
subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be
governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.
1968 Brussels Convention , supra note 84, art. 2.
87
Article 5(1) of the Convention states that
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be
sued:
1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance
of the obligation in question; in matters relating to individual contracts of
employment, this place is that where the employee habitually carries out his
work, or if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one
country, the employer may also be sued in the courts for the place where the
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Convention.89 In order to determine which court had jurisdiction to settle
the dispute, the Italian court sought to ascertain the proper characterization
of an action in precontractual liability. 90 The ECJ had to determine whether
such an action fell within the scope of ―matters relating to delict or quasidelict‖ under Article 5(3) of the Convention91—which gives jurisdiction to
the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred—or whether such
an action fell within the scope of ―matters relating to a contract‖ under
Article 5(1) of the Convention92—which gives jurisdiction to the courts of
the place of performance of the obligation. 93
The ECJ chose to characterize the issue as non-contractual. According
to the ECJ, the claim to recover the damage allegedly caused by the
unjustified breaking off of negotiations is in ―the absence of obligations
freely assumed by one party towards another on the occasion of
negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract . . .a matter relating
to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the
[1968] Brussels Convention.‖94
The analysis of the above-mentioned holding reveals that the ECJ
distinguishes between two types of precontractual liability. The ECJ seems
to distinguish between the situation where one of the parties has not freely
assumed obligations towards the other on the occasion of the negotiation of
a contract, and the situation where one party has freely assumed obligations
towards another on the occasion of such negotiations. While in the first
instance, the defendant‘s liability is characterized as non-contractual,
liability that arises out of the breach of a freely assumed obligation by one
party towards another on the occasion of the negotiations with a view to the
formation of a contract is a type of contractual liability.95 According to the
business which engaged the employee was or is now situated . . . .
Id. art. 5(1).
88
Article 5(3) of the Convention states that: ―A person domiciled in a Contracting State
may, in another Contracting State, be sued: . . . 3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasidelict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.‖ Id.art.5(3).
89
See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I07357, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000
C0334:EN:PDF.
90
Id.
91
See supra note 88.
92
See supra note 87.
93
See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I07357, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000
C0334:EN:PDF.
94
Id. ¶ 27.
95
In support of this reading of the Tacconi holding, see: Volders, First Appraisal, supra
note 49, at 465; Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544.
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Tacconi judgment, liability that arises during the negotiation period of a
contract is a non-contractual type of liability, unless it arises out of the
breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another on the
occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract.96
Contrary to what has been argued by a number of scholars, 97 Article
12 of the Rome II Regulation does not depart from the Tacconi judgment.
We do not share the view that ―pursuant to the new . . . Rome I and Rome II
Regulations, all liability claims arising out of pre-contractual relationship
between the parties, albeit a claim arising out of a culpa in contrahendo
within the meaning of Article 12 Rome II or not, are to be characterized as
non-contractual.‖98 On the contrary, it would seem that the characterization
of precontractual liability in the Rome I and Rome II Regulations falls in
line with the ECJ‘s holding for the following reasons.
First, Recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation 99 and Recital 7 of the Rome
II Regulation100 clearly state that the substantive scope and the provisions of
each Regulation ―should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).‖ It
follows that the provisions on the applicable law to precontractual liability
in each Regulation are to be construed in accordance with the ECJ case law
on the matter. In effect, the conflict-of-law rule provided by Article 12 of
the Rome II Regulation ought to be aligned with the Tacconi judgment.101
Second, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the
applicable law to ―non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior

96
See infra Part I(B)(1). For additional commentaries on the Tacconi judgment, see Jiří
Valdhans, The Pitfall of Interpreting Rome II Regulation Consistently with Brussels I
Regulation, 2009.2 JURISPRUDENCIJA 229 (2009); Michael Bonnel, Precontractual Liability,
the Brussels Jurisdiction Convention and . . . the Unidroit Principles, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS
À MARCEL FONTAINE 359 (2003); R. Libchaber, Commentaire de C.J.C.E, 17 Septembre
2002, Tacconi, DEFRÉNOIS 254 (2003); Anne Marmisse, Jurisprudence de la CJCE relative à
la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 (CJCE Fonderie Officine Mecchaniche
Tacconi Spa c/ Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 17 sept. 2002, aff.
C-334-00), RTD COM. 207 (2003); Thoma, supra note 22, at 676.
97
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544.
98
This view was initially expressed by Bart Volders in his article entitled Culpa in
Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation,
supra note 49, at 130. However, in a subsequent article, the author seems to have clarified
his position on the matter. According to the author, ―it seems, however, fair, to presume
that, despite the plain language of the Rome I Regulation, the European Legislature did not
intend to infringe upon the principle of party autonomy in precontractual relations but
instead ought to align its new conflict rules with the Tacconi judgement of the European
Court of Justice.‖ Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
99
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, para 7 (internal citations omitted).
100
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, para 7 (internal citations omitted).
101
In support of this view, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
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to the conclusion of a contract.‖102 The wording of Article 12 of the Rome
II Regulation suggests that there are two types of obligations at the
negotiation stage: contractual obligations and non-contractual obligations,
and that only the latter type of obligations are covered by Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation. It would seem that the European Legislature has taken
into account the existence of two types of precontractual liability in the
realm of conflict of laws: a contractual type of precontractual liability and a
non-contractual type of precontractual liability. Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation determines the applicable law to the non-contractual type of
precontractual liability. We will see that this provision determines the
applicable law to precontractual liability that does not arise out of the
breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another on the
occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract. 103 In
other words, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable
law to the type of precontractual liability that has been characterized as noncontractual by the ECJ in the Tacconi judgment.
Third, the Rome I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual
obligations, which has expressly excluded ―obligations arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ from its scope,104 has
excluded such obligations only insofar as they fall within the material scope
of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 105 Through this provision, the
European Legislature did not intend to characterize all claims arising out of
precontractual dealings as non-contractual,106 but only intended to preserve
the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. This provision
has only excluded from its scope culpa in contrahendo as it is defined by
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. Thus, precontractual liability that has
been characterized as contractual by the Tacconi judgment still falls within
the scope of the Rome I Regulation, while precontractual liability that has
been characterized as non-contractual by the Tacconi judgment falls outside
the scope of this Regulation. 107
Fourth, the ECJ has chosen to characterize certain claims arising out of
precontractual dealings as contractual in order to take into account the
existence of promises made by the parties at the negotiation stage. The
contractual characterization of such claims takes into account the right of
the parties to freely organize their precontractual relationship. Practically,
the parties have the right to organize their precontractual relationship
through the conclusion of a preliminary agreement that determines the
rights and obligations of each party at the negotiation stage. The
102
103
104
105
106
107

Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12.
See infra Part I(B)(1).
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1.
See infra Part I(A)(2).
Contra PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731.
In support of this view, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 678.
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contractual characterization of liability claims arising out of the breach of
such a preliminary agreement ought to be upheld in the realm of conflict of
laws.108 Such a characterization ensures that the issue of precontractual
liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement is submitted to
the law that governs the preliminary agreement itself. To hold otherwise
would thwart the parties‘ expectations by submitting the plaintiff‘s claim to
the law that is determined on the basis of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation. In such a case, the application of the rule provided by Article
12(1) of the Rome II Regulation to the parties‘ preliminary agreement will
submit liability arising out of the breach of such an agreement to the law of
the contract under negotiation. The application of this provision would
subject the parties‘ existing relationship under the current preliminary
agreement to the law of their contemplated relationship. The parties will be
unfairly surprised by the application of the law governing another contract
to their preliminary agreement. This outcome is ―at square with the
principle of party autonomy, pursuant to which the parties can not only
freely structure and organize their contractual relationship, but also their
precontractual dealings.‖109 Thus, we cannot assume that the European
Legislature, has intended ―to infringe upon the principle of party autonomy
in precontractual relations‖110 in the realm of conflict of laws.
In effect, the Rome I and Rome II Regulations fall in line with the ECJ
case law on jurisdiction. Indeed, whenever precontractual liability does not
arise out of the breach of a contractual obligation concluded at the occasion
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract, it is characterized
as non-contractual, and falls within the scope of the Rome II Regulation.
Inversely, whenever precontractual liability arises out of the breach of such
an obligation it is characterized as contractual and falls within the scope of
the Rome I Regulation. 111
2. The Rome I Regulation
The Rome I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual
obligations has expressly excluded ―obligations arising out of dealings prior
to the conclusion of a contract‖ from its scope.112 While such obligations
are expressly excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation, an issue
arises as to the extent of this exclusion.

108
109
110
111
112
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See infra Part I(B)(1).
Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
Id.
In support of this view, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 678.
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1.
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a. The Exclusion of Culpa in Contrahendo From the Scope of the Rome I
Regulation
It is widely acknowledged that the Rome I Regulation on the
applicable law to contractual obligations and the Rome II Regulation on the
applicable law to non-contractual obligations ―must be construed together
so that the scope of each excludes the other.‖113 Indeed, ―every obligation
in civil and commercial matters is either contractual or non-contractual for
the purposes of determining the choice of law regime in EPIL, and it cannot
be both.‖114 Furthermore, ―the concept of non-contractual obligations is
residual.‖115 This concept is defined negatively and encompasses the
obligations that are not contractual.116 It follows that obligations related to
commercial and civil matters that are excluded from the scope of the Rome
I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations are
characterized as non-contractual and fall, necessarily, within the scope of
the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-contractual
obligations.117 This is the case of culpa in contrahendo in EPIL which has
been expressly excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation, thereby
falling within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. Indeed, Article 1 of the
Rome I Regulation has expressly excluded from its scope ―obligations
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract,‖118 while
Recital 10 of the Rome I Regulation states that ―[o]bligations arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract are covered by Article 12 of
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007. Such obligations should therefore be
excluded from the scope of this Regulation.‖119
b. The Extent of the Exclusion
While Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation has expressly excluded
―obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖
from its scope, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers ―noncontractual obligation[s] arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a
contract.‖120 The divergent wording of the Rome I and the Rome II
Regulation gives rise to confusion regarding the characterization of
precontractual liability in EPIL. Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation gives
113

Andrew Scott, The Scope of Non-Contractual Obligations, in THE ROME II
REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, A NEW
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION REGIME 61 (John Ahern & William Binchy eds., 2009);
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 3.104.
114
Scott, supra note 113, at 59.
115
Id. at 61; see also Lagarde, supra note 33, at 585.
116
Scott, supra note 113, at 61.
117
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 3.104.
118
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1.
119
Id. at para. 10.
120
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art 12(1) (emphasis added).
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rise to two possible interpretations.
According to the first interpretation, Article 1 of the Rome I
Regulation has excluded from its scope all liability claims arising out of
precontractual dealings. In effect, ―all liability claims arising out of a
precontractual relationship between the parties, albeit a claim arising out of
a culpa in contrahendo within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation or not, are to be characterized as non-contractual.‖121 This
interpretation has the merit of ensuring uniformity of characterization since
it characterizes all types of precontractual liability as non-contractual.
However, it is at odds with the ECJ case-law on jurisdiction, 122 as well as
with the principle of party autonomy, which allows the parties to organize
their precontractual relationship through the conclusion of preliminary
agreements.123
According to the second interpretation, Article 1 of the Rome I
Regulation has excluded obligations arising out of dealings prior to the
conclusion of a contract only insofar as they fall within the material scope
of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 124 In effect, the Rome I Regulation
has only excluded from its scope non-contractual obligations arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. However, contractual
liability claims arising out of a precontractual relationship fall within the
scope of the Rome I Regulation. While this interpretation reintroduces
diversity where the Legislature has aimed to ensure uniformity, we believe
it to be exact for two reasons. First, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation
only excludes from the scope of the Rome I Regulation ―obligations arising
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.‖125 It follows that
liability claims arising out of the breach of contractual obligations that
derive from a contract that is concluded in anticipation of the ultimate
agreement, such as obligations arising out of a preliminary agreement126, do
not fall within the scope of the exclusion of Article 1 of the Rome I
Regulation.127 Second, Recital 10 of the Rome I Regulation states that
―[o]bligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract
are covered by Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007. Such
obligations should therefore be excluded from the scope of this
121
This view was expressed by B. Volders in a first article entitled Culpa in Contrahendo
in the Conflict of Laws: A commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. See
Volders, Commentary, supra note 49, at 130. The author has clarified his position in a
subsequent article. See supra note 98. In support of this view, see PLENDER AND
WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731.
122
See supra Part I(A)(1).
123
Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466.
124
See Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163.
125
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1.
126
For a list of contractual obligations that are concluded at the precontractual stage see
infra Part I(B)(1)(b).
127
Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163.
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Regulation.‖128 This Recital implies that Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation
only intended to preserve the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation, by excluding from the scope of the Rome I Regulation claims
of precontractual liability that are covered by Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation. In other words, we have to determine the contours of the
category of culpa in contrahendo as it is defined by Article 12 of the Rome
II Regulation in order to determine which claims fall outside the scope of
the Rome I Regulation.
B. The Autonomous Characterization of Culpa in Contrahendo
Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation has conferred upon the concept
of culpa in contrahendo an autonomous meaning that is not necessarily
interpreted within the meaning of national law. According to Recital 30 of
the Rome II Regulation,
[c]ulpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an
autonomous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within
the meaning of national law. It should include the violation of the
duty of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations.
Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct
link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. This
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers
personal injury, Article 4 or other relevant provisions of this
Regulation should apply.‖129

The autonomous meaning conferred upon culpa in contrahendo raises
the issue of the substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
In order to determine which matters fall within the scope of this article, we
must determine the contours of the category of culpa in contrahendo in the
Rome II Regulation.
Three guidelines must be followed in order to determine the
substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation: (1) The
substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation must be
determined in accordance with the ECJ case law on jurisdiction as well as
with the regulatory provisions of the European instruments on Private
International law. 130 (2) The substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation must be construed in accordance with the substantive scope of
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Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, at para 10.
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30.
130
According to Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[t]he substantive scope and the
provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (5) (Brussels I) and the instruments dealing with the law
applicable to contractual obligations.‖ Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at
Recital 7.
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the Rome I Regulation so that the scope of each regulation excludes the
other. In effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only encompasses
precontractual liability that has been excluded by the Rome I Regulation.
(3) The substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation must be
determined in accordance with the guideline provided by Recital 30 of the
Rome II Regulation.
The analysis of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation in light of the
above-mentioned guidelines reveals that this provision does not cover all
types of precontractual liability. The scope of this provision is limited to
the following matters: (1) Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers
―non-contractual obligations;‖131 and (2) Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation only covers non-contractual obligations that present a direct link
with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.
1. Culpa in Contrahendo Does Not Encompass the Breach of Contractual
Obligations Concluded at the Occasion of Negotiations With a View to The
Formation of a Contract
The wording of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation suggests that
there are two types of obligations that arise at the negotiation stage:
contractual obligations, and non-contractual obligations. Accordingly,
there are two types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a contractual type of
precontractual liability that arises out of the breach of a contractual
obligation, and a non-contractual type of precontractual liability that does
not arise out of the breach of a contractual obligation. Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation only covers the latter type of precontractual liability. 132
Four reasons justify the exclusion of precontractual liability arising out
of the breach of contractual obligations from the scope of Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation.
First, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable
law to ―non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the
conclusion of a contract.‖133 The wording of this Article suggests that
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a
view to the formation of an ultimate agreement have been expressly
excluded from its scope.
Second, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation has excluded ―obligations
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract,‖134 only insofar
as they fall within the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation.135 The Rome I Regulation has only excluded from its scope
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non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of
a contract. This Regulation determines the applicable law to claims arising
out of the breach of contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of
negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a contract.
Third, the application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation to
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a
view to the conclusion of a contract will thwart the parties‘ expectations
regarding the applicable law. This is especially true whenever the parties
have entered into a preliminary agreement that organizes their negotiations.
In such a case, the application of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the
Rome II Regulation to the parties‘ preliminary agreement will submit
liability arising out of the breach of such an agreement to the law of the
contract under negotiation. The application of this provision would subject
the parties‘ existing relationship under the current preliminary agreement to
the law of their contemplated relationship, which would deprive them of the
right to rely on the law that governs their preliminary agreement.
Fourth, contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of
negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a contract must be excluded
from the scope of the Rome II Regulation in order to grant the parties, who
are not pursuing a commercial activity, the freedom to choose the law that
governs their preliminary agreements. Contrary to obligations that fall
within the scope of the Rome I Regulation, obligations that fall within the
scope of the Rome II Regulation are governed by the law that is chosen by
the parties, who are not pursuing a commercial activity, only when this
choice is made after the event giving rise to the damage occurred. By
submitting preliminary agreements to the rules provided by the Rome II
Regulation, we preclude the parties, who are not pursuing a commercial
activity, from choosing the applicable law to their preliminary agreement.
In effect, a choice of law clause that is inserted in a preliminary agreement,
concluded between parties who are not pursuing a commercial activity,
becomes inefficient. Such a limitation on party choice is inadmissible
whenever the parties have chosen to organize their precontractual
relationship by entering into a preliminary agreement. Therefore,
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a
view to the conclusion of a contract must be excluded from the scope of the
Rome II Regulation. Such obligations are governed by the rules provided
by the Rome I Regulation which allow all parties to choose the applicable
law without any restrictions.
Thus, contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations
with a view to the formation of an ultimate agreement ought to be excluded
from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. However, the
concepts of contractual and non-contractual obligations have yet to be
defined in the realm of conflict of laws in EPIL: the European Legislature
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did not provide a definition of the concepts of contractual and noncontractual obligations in the Rome I and Rome II Regulation, 136 and the
ECJ has yet to define the type of obligations that are excluded from the
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. It is only in the realm of
conflict of jurisdictions between the E.U. Member States that the ECJ has
defined the concepts of contractual and non-contractual matters. This is the
case for claims arising out of precontractual liability, where the Tacconi
judgment has, in the realm of conflict of jurisdictions, characterized two
types of precontractual liability. The first type of liability is a contractual
type of liability that arises out of the breach of an obligation ―freely
assumed by one party towards the other on the occasion of negotiations
with a view to the formation of a contract.‖137 The second type of liability
is a non-contractual type of liability that does not arise out of the breach of
such a freely assumed obligation. 138 While this distinction has been
established in the realm of conflict of jurisdictions between the EU Member
States, we will show that it can be extended to the realm of conflict of laws,
and that it should be used to determine the type of precontractual liability
that is excluded from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. In
effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability that
arises out of the breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards
the other on the occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a
contract (a). Thus, liability that arises from the breach of a preliminary
agreement or of an obligation arising out of a pollicitation is excluded from
the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation (b).
a. The Definition of the Excluded Contractual Obligations
The concept of a ―freely assumed obligation by one party towards
another‖ is used by the ECJ in order to determine what matters are,
according to Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, ―related to a
contract.‖139 According to the ECJ, whenever the issue involves a freely
assumed obligation by one party towards the other, it constitutes a
contractual matter that triggers the application of Article 5(1) of the
Brussels I Regulation. 140 Inversely, whenever the issue does not involve a
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Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner
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See supra Part I(A)(1).
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See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des
Surfaces SA , 1992 E.C.R. I-03967; see also H. Gaudement-Tallon, REV. CRIT. DIP 1989
730; J.-M. Bischoff, obs., JDI 1993 469; J. Kullmann, obs., D. 1993. Somm. 214; P.
Jourdain, obs., RTD Civ. 1993, 131; T. Azzi, Bruxelles I, Rome I, Rome II: regard sur la
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freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other, it constitutes a
non-contractual matter that triggers the application of Article 5(3) of the
Brussels I Regulation.141 It follows that the existence or the absence of a
―freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other‖ determines
whether the issue constitutes a contractual matter or a non-contractual
matter for the purposes of applying the Brussels I Regulation.
While the ECJ has defined the notions of contractual and noncontractual matters in the Brussels I Regulation, it has yet to define the
concepts of contractual obligations in the Rome I Regulation and of noncontractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation. This lack of definition
has caused scholars to wonder whether the concepts of contractual
obligations in the Rome I Regulation and of non-contractual obligations in
the Rome II Regulation amount to the concepts of contractual and noncontractual matters as defined by the ECJ case law on jurisdiction. 142 The
answer to this question has a direct impact on the applicable law to
precontractual liability in EPIL. Because Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation is only applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, we must determine whether
such obligations amount to non-contractual matters as defined by the ECJ
case law on jurisdiction or not. Some scholars have argued that the
―diverging ratio legis of these instruments constitutes a barrier to a common
notion‖143 of the non-contractual area in the Brussels I Regulation, which
determines the procedural rules in EPIL, and the Rome II Regulation, which
determines the conflict-of-law rules in a non-contractual situation.144
Others have argued that ―convergences are possible despite the different
objectives and scheme of the [European] Regulations.‖145 Without
venturing into detailed argumentation, we believe that the concept of noncontractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation amounts to the concept of
non-contractual matters in the Brussels I Regulation, and that Article 12 of
the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability arising out of the breach of
a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other on the occasion
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract for the following
141
Case 189/97, Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., 1988
E.C.R. I-05565; B. Audit, obs., D. 1989. Somm. 254; H. Gaudemet-Tallon, note, REV.CRIT.
DIP 1989 215; A. Huet, obs., JDI 1989 457; see also Azzi, supra note 140.
142
See Marta Pertegas, The notion of contractual obligation in Brussels I and Rome I, in
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I 175 (J. Meeusen, et al., eds., 2004); Azzi,
supra note 140; Scott, supra note 113, at 57; Valdhans, supra note 96, at 229–44.
143
Pertegas, supra note 142, at 176.
144
See M.-L. Niboyet & G. de Geouffre de La Pradelle, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ §
252 (2007); B. Haftel, La notion de matière contractuelle en droit international privé ¶ 44
(2008) (unpublished Phd. thesis, Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) (on file with author).
145
Pertegas, supra note 142, at 176; see also Azzi, supra note 140, at 1621–22; PLENDER
& WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 738.
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reasons.
First, Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation clearly states that
the substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be
consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (5) (Brussels I) and the
instruments dealing with the law applicable to contractual
obligations.146

It follows that the common concepts used by the instruments of
European Private International Law must be construed consistently.
Ensuring consistency between the European Regulations on Private
International Law requires that all common concepts be given a common
meaning.147 Thus, the concept of contractual obligations must amount to
the concept of contractual matters as it is defined by the ECJ case law on
jurisdiction. The latter appears to be a wider concept that seems to include
the former.148 In effect, a ―contractual obligation‖ is necessarily ―a matter
relating to contract‖. However, since the concept of ―matters relating to
contract‖ is, according to the ECJ, ―not to be understood as covering a
situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party
towards the other,‖149 it follows that a ―contractual obligation‖ is
necessarily a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another.
Inversely, a ―non-contractual obligation‖ constitutes a ―non-contractual
matter‖ and is not a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the
other.
Second, by characterizing culpa in contrahendo as non-contractual in
the realm of conflict of laws, the European Legislature has chosen to be
consistent with the characterization of precontractual liability in matters
related to jurisdiction.150 The non-contractual characterization of culpa in
contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation pleads in favor of a uniform
characterization of all common concepts between the European Regulations
on Private International Law.151 Such a uniform characterization is ―more
natural, simpler and more coherent.‖152 It is also consistent with the
Legislature‘s objective of providing uniform rules of private international
law in the EU.
Third, the uniform characterization of the contractual and non146
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150
Azzi, supra note 140, at 1622.
151
This view is expressed by Azzi. See id.
152
Id.
147

478

Culpa in Contrahendo in European Private International Law
32:451 (2012)

contractual areas in EPIL does not necessarily hinder the divergent
objectives each Regulation aims to achieve. The difference that separates
the rules provided by each regulation does not stem from the
characterization of the issue, but from the connecting factors that are
designated by the Legislature. 153 It can be argued that while the Brussels I
Regulation aims to improve the proper administration of justice, the Rome I
and Rome II Regulation aim to improve the predictability of the outcome of
litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of
judgments in the area of obligations.154 However, these objectives can be
met through the choice of connecting factors and not necessarily through
characterization. 155 In effect, the state whose courts have jurisdiction by
application of the Brussels I Regulation is not necessarily the state whose
law governs the issue by application of the rules provided by the Rome I
and Rome II Regulations. 156
Fourth, the exclusion of freely assumed obligations by one party
towards the other from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation
aims to protect the parties‘ expectations as to the applicable law. 157 To hold
otherwise, would subject the parties‘ existing contractual relationship to the
law of their contemplated contractual relationship, by application of the lex
contractus in negotio. The parties will be unfairly surprised by the
application of the law governing another contract to their current
contractual relationship. Thus, obligations that arise out of a promise made
by one of the parties to the other ought to be excluded from the scope of
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
Fifth, the exclusion of freely assumed obligations by one party towards
the other from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation protects
party autonomy by submitting obligations arising out of a promise made by
one party towards the other to its own law. In effect, a freely assumed
obligation by one party towards another on the occasion of negotiations
with a view to the formation of a contract is governed by its own law and

153

Id.
This objective is stated in Recital 6 of the Rome I and in Recital 6 of the Rome II
Regulation. According to both Recitals:
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not by the law that governs the ultimate agreement it precedes.
Finally, the concept of a ―freely assumed obligation‖ draws a clear line
between contractual obligations and non-contractual obligations. Such a
clear-cut criterium is ―easily identifiable and reasonably foreseeable for the
parties to the dispute.‖158 Moreover, it helps define the concept of
―contractual obligations‖ narrowly which confers upon Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation a larger scope. It is important that this article
encompass the vast majority of precontractual liability cases in order to
reach uniformity in the realm of conflict of laws between the Member
States.
It should be noted that the concept of a ―freely assumed obligation by
one party towards another‖ has raised many objections from German
scholars who have considered it too narrow for purposes of private
international law. 159 In their view, ―it is sufficient [in order to characterize
the situation as contractual] for one of the parties to create the expectation
of fulfillment of certain obligations and for the other party to rely on it,
without necessarily freely assuming such obligations.‖160 Despite the
German critique of the judgment, the narrow exception provided by the ECJ
ought to be upheld. We cannot allow ―the characterization of the ensuing
precontractual liability to vary according to how the various national laws
characterize the issue.‖161 The German view on the matter cannot be upheld
only because it reflects the German position on characterization. To hold
otherwise would violate ―the principle that the key concepts of EPIL are
given an autonomous meaning,‖162 and would introduce diversity where the
Legislature has sought to achieve uniformity. It follows that Article 12 of
the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability arising out of the breach of
a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other on the occasion
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract.
b. The List of Excluded Contractual Obligations
There are two types of freely assumed obligations by one party
towards the other on the occasion of negotiations with a view to the
formation of a contract: obligations that arise from preliminary agreements,
and obligations that arise from pollicitation.
i. Preliminary Agreements
According to Professor Farnsworth, the term ―preliminary agreement‖
can refer to ―any agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, that is
158
159
160
161
162
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made during negotiations in anticipation of some later agreement that will
be the culmination of the negotiations.‖163 There are various types of
preliminary agreements that are concluded on the occasion of
negotiations.164 ―These agreements appear under a variety of names
including ‗letters of intent,‘ ‗commitment letters,‘ ‗binders,‘ ‗agreements in
principle,‘ ‗memoranda of understandings,‘ and ‗heads of agreement.‘‖165
According to Professor J. Schmidt-Szalewski, preliminary agreements can
be divided into two categories: preliminary agreements that affect the
negotiations, and preliminary agreements that affect the conclusion of the
ultimate agreement. 166
Professor J. Schmidt-Szalewski mentions two types of preliminary
agreements that affect negotiations: preliminary agreements that organize
the negotiations and preliminary agreements that impose on the parties an
obligation to negotiate. 167
Preliminary agreements that organize negotiations provide the rules
that the parties must follow during the course of dealings prior to the
conclusion of a contract. 168 Such preliminary agreements only aim to
organize the negotiation procedure and do not determine the outcome of
negotiations.169 Parties can agree to organize their negotiations through
specific bargaining rules that impose various obligations at the negotiation
stage. The parties can agree to be bound, for example, by the following
precontractual obligations: an obligation of confidentiality, an obligation of
disclosure, an obligation of exclusivity, an obligation to respect certain
deadlines, and an obligation of loyalty. 170
Preliminary agreements that impose an obligation to negotiate can
either impose an obligation to enter into negotiation or an obligation to
continue negotiations.171
The first type of preliminary agreement
encompasses agreements to start negotiations and ―preferential
agreements.‖172 A ―preferential agreement‖ is an agreement whereby one
party agrees to offer the conclusion of a contract exclusively to the other
party in the event he decides to enter into negotiations. 173 It differs from the
agreement to start negotiations inasmuch as the first type of preliminary

163

Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 249–50.
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agreement does not confer upon the party a preferential right to the
conclusion of the contract.
While preliminary agreements that impose an obligation to enter into
negotiation signal the beginning of negotiations, preliminary agreements
that impose an obligation to continue the negotiations mark a ―pause in the
negotiations,‖174 and set out all the terms that have been agreed upon so far
by the parties, who agree to continue the negotiations in order to reach the
ultimate agreement. 175 Two types of such agreements have been described
by Professor Farnsworth: the ―agreement with open terms‖ and the
―agreement to negotiate.‖176 The ―agreement with open terms‖ ―sets out
most of the terms of the deal, and the parties agree to be bound by these
terms. But they undertake to continue negotiating on other matters to reach
agreement on some terms that are left open but that will be contained in the
ultimate agreement.‖177 This agreement has two legal effects on the parties.
First, the parties have an obligation to negotiate in good faith and can incur
liability if failure to reach agreement on those open terms results from a
breach of that obligation. 178 Second, if, ―despite continued negotiation by
both parties, no agreement is reached on those open terms so that there is no
ultimate agreement, the parties are bound by their original agreement, and
the other matters are governed by whatever terms a court will supply.‖179
The ―agreement to negotiate‖ is an agreement where the parties ―set out
specific substantive terms of the deal but . . . do not agree to be bound as to
these terms.‖180 In contrast with the preliminary agreement with open
terms, the parties are only bound by their obligation to negotiate in good
faith.181 Therefore, ―if, despite negotiation by both parties, ultimate
agreement is not reached, the parties are not bound by any agreement.‖182
However, they might incur liability in the event of a breach of their
obligation to negotiate in good faith.183
Preliminary agreements that affect the conclusion of the ultimate
agreement ―bring the parties closer to the ultimate agreement.‖184 These
agreements affect the outcome of negotiations by ―securing consent to the
ultimate agreement.‖185 According to Professor Schmidt-Szalewski, there
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are two types of preliminary agreements that affect the conclusion of the
ultimate agreement.186 The first type of preliminary agreement is an
―option contract‖ whereby one party has already given his consent to the
ultimate agreement and agrees to hold the offer for a certain period of time
while awaiting for the acceptance of the other party.187 This type of
agreement differs from the ―preferential agreement‖ inasmuch as the party
who is bound by the latter has only agreed to make an offer to the other
party in the event he decides to enter into negotiations.188 The second type
of preliminary agreement is an agreement whereby both parties agree to
conclude the ultimate agreement but postpone the formation of the contract
upon the completion of a particular formality.189
The applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a
preliminary agreement has not been expressly determined by the Rome I
and Rome II Regulations. The Legislature‘s silence has given rise to
hesitation regarding the applicable law. Four possible solutions have been
advanced.
According to the first theory, liability arising out of the breach of a
preliminary agreement is excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation
and falls within the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. This
interpretation cannot be upheld for two reasons. First, it contradicts the
wording of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation which only applies to
―non-contractual obligations.‖190 We have shown that freely assumed
obligations by one party towards another on the occasion of negotiations
with a view to the formation of a contract are excluded from the scope of
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 191 Second, this interpretation thwarts
the parties‘ justified expectations by submitting the contractual relationship
that they have established through the conclusion of a preliminary
agreement, to the law that governs the contractual relationship that they
were contemplating at the time the preliminary agreement was concluded.
A second theory excludes liability arising out of the breach of a
preliminary agreement from the scope of the Rome I Regulation and from
the scope of the Rome II Regulation. According to this theory, liability
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement is not covered by either
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Id.; see also: TERRÉ, supra note 4, at 190.
TERRÉ, supra note 4, at 191; Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 31.
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TERRÉ, supra note 4 at 195.
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Id. See also Farnsworth supra note 1, at 251 where the author describes the
―agreement to engage in a transaction‖ which ―involves a commitment by one or both parties
to do something such as buy, sell, or lend in the future.‖ This agreement binds one of the
parties to carry through the transaction, but ―postpones preparation and execution of the
requisite documents and the attendant expense for such items as legal fees, indemnities, and
taxes.‖
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one of the two European Regulations, but by the applicable law to
contractual obligations in the relevant jurisdiction. This law is determined
according to the national conflict-of-law rules of the court where the claim
has been brought. 192 This interpretation cannot be upheld for two reasons.
First, it reintroduces diversity where the European Legislature has sought to
achieve uniformity. Second, the Rome I Regulation did not exclude
preliminary agreements from its scope. Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation
has excluded ―obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of
a contract,‖193 only in so far as they fall within the material scope of Article
12 of the Rome II Regulation.194 The Rome I Regulation has only excluded
from its scope non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to
the conclusion of the contract.
A third theory submits liability arising out of the breach of a
preliminary agreement to the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation, but
considers that every agreement that aims at the conclusion of another
contract should not be viewed as an independent contract but as an
―outgrowth of the contemplated contract‖195 and should, therefore, be
governed by the applicable law to the contract under negotiation. 196 It is
argued that this outcome reaches a coherent result whereby the issues of the
existence of the ultimate agreement and of liability arising out of the breach
of a preliminary agreement are governed by the same law, namely the law
of the contract under negotiation. 197
According to Professor Bollée, incoherence might arise whenever the
issues of the existence of the ultimate agreement and of the liability arising
out of the breach of a preliminary agreement are governed by two different
laws that treat both issues differently. 198 This would be the case, for
example, whenever the parties have concluded an option contract, whereby
the promisor promises to hold the offer for a certain period of time. The
revocation by the promisor of the option contract before the time period
elapses raises two issues. First, it raises the issue of whether the acceptance
that was issued by the other party after the revocation of the promise has
given birth to the ultimate agreement. Second, it raises the issue of the
promisor‘s liability for unlawful revocation of the promise. The application
of the law that governs the ultimate agreement in the first instance, and the
application of the law that governs the preliminary agreement in the second
instance, will reach incoherent results whenever the two laws treat both
issues differently. This would be the case, for example, whenever the law
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
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that governs the ultimate agreement states that the contract did not come
into existence and that the defendant is precontractually liable for
unlawfully revoking his promise, while the law that governs the preliminary
agreement states that the ultimate agreement has been concluded, thereby
exonerating the defendant from liability. In order to eliminate incoherence,
authors have suggested submitting all issues to the law that governs the
ultimate agreement. 199 This law is applicable to the existence of the
ultimate agreement by virtue of Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, 200
and should, therefore, also govern liability arising out of the breach of a
preliminary agreement.
In spite of this last argument, this third theory cannot be upheld for
three reasons. First, this theory is without legal basis. Nothing in the Rome
I Regulation indicates that preliminary agreements are to be automatically
governed by the applicable law to the ultimate agreement. The application
of this law is only possible through a very loose interpretation of the rules
provided by Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.201
Second, it thwarts the expectations of the parties who do not expect the
law that governs their contemplated contractual relationship to govern their
preliminary agreement. Indeed, parties who have concluded a preliminary
agreement have shaped their behavior, at the precontractual stage, on the
basis of their preliminary agreement and have taken into consideration the
applicable law to such an agreement. Unless the parties have specifically
submitted their preliminary agreement to the law that governs their ultimate
agreement, the former is governed by a law that is to be determined
irrespective of the law of the contract under negotiation.
Third, while it is true that, in some situations, the issues of the
existence of the ultimate agreement and of liability arising out of the breach
of a preliminary agreement are intertwined—especially when the parties
have concluded a preliminary agreement that affects the conclusion of the
ultimate agreement or a preferential agreement—it is wrong to assume that
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement to both issues
reaches the more appropriate result. On the contrary, it would seem that, in
this particular situation, the application of the law that governs the
preliminary agreement is the more appropriate law.
First, the application of this law to the liability arising out of the
breach of the preliminary agreement is the naturally applicable law to this
type of liability.
Indeed, the parties who have organized their
precontractual relationship through the conclusion of a preliminary
agreement expect their behavior to be regulated by the law that governs it.
They have relied on the provisions of this law in order to gauge the effects
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of their actions.
Second, the application of this law to the existence of the contract
conforms to the will of the parties. By entering into a preliminary
agreement that affects the conclusion of the ultimate agreement, the parties
have organized the formation of the future contract. Their preliminary
agreement has determined the conditions that are required for the
conclusion of the contract. In other words, they have laid down the rules
that govern the formation of the ultimate agreement, in their preliminary
agreement. Therefore, it is only natural for the law that governs the
preliminary agreement to govern the existence of the ultimate agreement.
Parties that have entered into a preliminary agreement affecting the
conclusion of the ultimate agreement have implicitly displaced the default
rule provided by Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 202 The conclusion
of a preliminary agreement implies that the parties have chosen to submit
the existence of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs the
preliminary agreement itself. In effect, the conclusion of a preliminary
agreement that affects the conclusion of the ultimate agreement amounts to
an implicit choice of law by the parties: by entering into such a preliminary
agreement, the parties have implicitly chosen to displace the application of
the law of the contract under negotiation, and have submitted the existence
of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs their preliminary
agreement.203 To hold otherwise would go against the principle of party
autonomy which allows the parties to freely organize their precontractual
relationship, and which, according to Recital 11 of the Rome I Regulation,
constitutes ―one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in
matters of contractual obligations.‖204 For the above-mentioned reasons, we
cannot subscribe to the automatic application of the law of the contract
under negotiation to the liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary
agreement.
A fourth possible theory would be to submit liability arising out of the
breach of a preliminary agreement to the law that governs the preliminary
agreement itself. Despite the wording of Article 1 of the Rome I
Regulation, this law is determined on the basis of the rules provided by the
Rome I Regulation. 205 Indeed, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation only
202

According to this provision, ―the existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of
a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the
contract or term were valid.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 10(1).
203
Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that the choice of law by the parties can
either ―be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the
circumstances of the case.‖ Id. art. 3 (1). It follows that whenever the parties have concluded
a preliminary agreement, the circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate that they have
chosen to submit the existence of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs their
preliminary agreement.
204
Id. at para. 11.
205
See Thoma, supra note 22, at 678.
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excludes from its scope precontractual liability as it is defined by Article 12
of the Rome II Regulation, and did not exclude from its scope liability
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement. Therefore, the
applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary
agreement is either chosen by the parties in the preliminary agreement
itself, or determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
Whenever the parties have inserted a choice of law clause in their
preliminary agreement, the law that is chosen by the parties governs the
liability arising out of the breach of the preliminary agreement. 206
Whenever the parties have not inserted a choice of law clause in their
preliminary agreement, this law is determined on the basis of Article 4 of
the Rome I Regulation. This Article provides for the application of the law
of the habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of
the contract, unless it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the
contract is manifestly more closely connected to the law of another country,
or unless the debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract cannot
be determined.207 In order to determine the law that governs liability arising
out of the breach of a preliminary agreement, we must distinguish the
situation where the debtor of the characteristic performance of the
preliminary agreement cannot be determined from the situation where the
debtor of the characteristic performance of the preliminary agreement can
be determined.
Whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the
preliminary agreement cannot be determined, the applicable law is
determined on the basis of the escape clause provided by Article 4(4) of the
Rome I Regulation. This would be the case, for example, whenever the
parties have concluded a preliminary agreement that organizes
negotiations.208 In this situation, both parties agree to be bound by the same
types of obligations and it is not possible to determine the debtor of the
characteristic performance of the contract. According to Article 4(4) of the
Rome I Regulation, ―the contract shall be governed by the law of the
country with which it is most closely connected.‖209 It should be noted that
the employment of this escape clause, in this situation, will most likely lead
to the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement. Recital
21 of the Rome I Regulation states that
[i]n the absence of choice, where the applicable law cannot be
determined either on the basis of the fact that the contract can be
categorized as one of the specified types or as being the law of the
country of habitual residence of the party required to effect the
206
207
208
209
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characteristic performance of the contract, the contract should be
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected. In order to determine that country, account should be
taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close
relationship with another contract or contracts.‖210

In effect, courts will most likely find that the preliminary agreement has a
very close relationship to the ultimate agreement, leading, in most cases, to
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement. However,
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement is not
automatic and depends on a factual analysis of the relevant contacts of the
particular case. Indeed, Recital 21 of the Rome I Regulation only provides
guidelines that help courts determine the relevant contacts and does not
impose the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement.
Whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the
preliminary agreement can be determined, the law that governs the
preliminary agreement can either coincide with the law that governs the
ultimate agreement or not. The law that governs the preliminary agreement
does not coincide with the law that governs the ultimate agreement
whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the preliminary
agreement is not the debtor of the characteristic performance of the ultimate
agreement.211 This would be the case, for example, whenever the
prospective buyer of goods has promised to hold his offer to buy the goods
for a certain period of time in an option contract. In this situation, the debtor
of the characteristic performance of the option contract is the prospective
buyer, while the debtor of the characteristic performance of the ultimate
sale agreement is the prospective seller.
The law that governs the preliminary agreement coincides with the law
that governs the ultimate agreement in two situations. First, it coincides
with the law of the ultimate agreement whenever the debtor of the
characteristic performance of the preliminary agreement is the debtor of the
characteristic performance of the ultimate agreement. This would be the
case, for example, whenever the parties have concluded an agreement with
open terms, whereby the characteristic performance of this agreement
coincides with the characteristic performance of the ultimate agreement. 212
Second, the law that governs the preliminary agreement coincides with the
law of the ultimate agreement whenever the employment of the escape
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation leads to the
application of the law of the ultimate agreement. According to this
provision, ―where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the
contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that
210
211
212
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indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply‖.213
It should be noted that the employment of the escape clause will, in most
cases, lead to the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement.
According to Recital 20 of the Rome I Regulation,
where the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a
country other than that indicated in Article 4(1) or (2), an escape
clause should provide that the law of that other country is to apply.
In order to determine that country, account should be taken, inter
alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close
relationship with another contract or contracts.‖214

However, the application of this law is not automatic. The employment of
the escape clause is exceptional and can lead to the application of a
different law whenever the factual situation is more closely connected to
another law. Recital 20 of the Rome I Regulation only provides indications
as to the relevant contacts that ought to be considered and does not impose
the application of the law of the ultimate agreement.
ii. Pollicitation
The wording of the Tacconi holding seems to suggest that ―whilst
Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation requires an obligation freely
assumed by one party towards the other, it does not require a contract to
have been concluded.‖215 The concept of a freely assumed obligation by
one party towards the other does not only encompass obligations that arise
out of a concluded agreement between the parties, but seems to encompass
obligations arising out of a unilateral act as well. ―Unilateral acts may be
generally defined as acts that are the manifestation of the will of one
person.‖216 A unilateral act can be a source of obligations whenever one
person has manifested his will to be bound by a promise that has not been
accepted by the other. It differs from a contract inasmuch as the latter
requires a meeting of the minds, whereby one of the parties promises to do
something to the other party who accepts the former‘s promise.
A literal interpretation of the concept of a freely assumed obligation by
one party towards the other would exclude liability that stems from the
breach of an obligation arising out of a unilateral act from the scope of the
Rome II Regulation.217 Moreover, it would seem that ―unilateral acts
213

Article 4(3) of Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU).
Recital 20 of Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU).(emphasis
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216
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intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated
contract‖ fall within the scope of the Rome I Regulation. 218 Indeed, Article
11 of the Rome I Regulation expressly provides the applicable law to the
formal validity of such acts. 219 Thus, it appears that liability that stems
from the breach of an obligation arising out of a unilateral act that is
undertaken at the precontractual stage and that is intended to have a legal
effect on the contemplated contract is excluded from the scope of Article 12
of the Rome II Regulation. This type of liability is governed by the rules
provided by the Rome I Regulation. 220
At the negotiation stage, a unilateral act intended to have legal effect
on the contemplated contract constitutes a ―pollicitation.‖ Pollicitation can
be defined as a type of offer whereby the pollicitor promises to hold the
offer for a certain period of time. Pollicitation differs from a regular offer
because it is characterized by the promise of the pollicitor to hold the offer
for a certain period of time. It also differs from an option contract because
the pollicitor does not seek the offeree‘s consent as to the obligation to hold
the offer. It is a unilateral act that binds the pollicitor in the absence of an
agreement between the two parties.221
While the revocation of the offer falls within the scope of Article 12 of
the Rome II Regulation, 222 the revocation of a pollicitation is not covered by
this provision. The obligation arising out of a pollicitation cannot be
characterized as non-contractual because it is freely assumed by one party
towards the other. Thus, liability arising out of the breach of such an
obligation falls within the scope of the Rome I Regulation.
The applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a

INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT FÜR EUROPA 28 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible, eds.,
2007).
218
See Pauknerová, supra note 216, at 132.
219
According to Article 11(3) of the Rome I Regulation,
a unilateral act intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated
contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which
governs or would govern the contract in substance under this Regulation, or of the
law of the country where the act was done, or of the law of the country where the
person by whom it was done had his habitual residence at that time.
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 11.
220
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221
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(unpublished thesis Aix-en-Provence) (on file with author); Jacques Flour et al., LES
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pollicitation has not been expressly determined by the Rome I Regulation.
We must determine this law through the application of the general rules
provided by the Rome I Regulation. However, this law cannot be chosen
unilaterally by the pollicitor. A choice of law clause is only valid when
both parties have agreed on the applicable law.
It follows that the applicable law to liability arising out of the breach
of a pollicitation is determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation. In principle, liability arising out of the breach of pollicitation is
governed by the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor, unless the
application of this law is displaced in favor of the application of the law of
the contract under negotiation.
Liability arising out of the breach of a pollicitation is, in principle,
determined on the basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 223 The
implementation of this rule leads to the application of the law of the
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the
unilateral act. Because the promise to hold the offer is the characteristic
performance of the pollicitation, liability arising out of the breach of a
pollicitation would be governed by the law of the habitual residence of the
pollicitor. It follows that liability arising out of the breach of the
pollicitation is governed by the law that governs the pollicitation itself,
irrespective of the law that governs the contemplated contract. The absence
of an agreement between parties does not preclude the application of the
Rome I Regulation to the pollicitation.
Technically, the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation are perfectly
compatible with a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other
that does not arise out of an agreement between the two parties.224
However, the application of the law that governs the pollicitation incurs two
criticisms. First, it might lead to incoherent results whenever the revocation
of the pollicitation affects the existence of the contemplated contract and
the defendant‘s precontractual liability. 225 In this situation, the existence of
the contract would be governed by the law of the contract under
negotiation, while liability arising out of the breach of the pollicitation is
governed by the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor. Incoherence
might arise whenever the two laws treat the issue of the existence of the
contract differently. Second, the application of the law of the pollicitation

223
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might be unfair to the other party who did not foresee the application of the
law of a unilateral act to which he did not consent.
Whenever the application of the law of the habitual residence of the
pollicitor leads to inappropriate results, it would be more appropriate to
displace the application of the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor
through the use of the escape clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I
Regulation, and to submit liability arising out of the breach of the
pollicitation to the law of the contemplated contract. While the escape
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation does not allow the
automatic application of the law of the contemplated contract, this law
ought to be designated for three reasons. First, Article 11(3) of the Rome I
Regulation designates the ―law which governs or would govern the contract
in substance under this Regulation‖226 as one of the applicable laws to the
formal validity of ―unilateral act intended to have legal effect relating to an
existing or contemplated contract.‖227
Nothing precludes us from
extending, through the use of the escape clause provided by Article 4(3) of
the Rome I Regulation, the application of this law to the liability arising out
of the breach of a pollicitation.228 In fact, it has been argued that ―unless
otherwise provided in Rome I, the lex causae governs any issue in a
contract, at least of private law character.‖229 Second, the application of this
law helps eliminate incoherence by avoiding dépeçage.230 In effect, the
issues of contract existence and of precontractual liability would be
governed by the same law whenever the pollicitor has revoked his
pollicitation. Third, the application of the law of the contemplated contract
would help submit all types of precontractual liability that do not arise out
of the breach of a preliminary agreement to the same law. In effect, liability
arising out of the breach of a pollicitation and liability arising out of the
revocation of an offer are, in principle, governed by the same law.231
226
227
228

Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 11(3).
Id. See also infra note 254.
See also Recital 20 of Council Regulation 593/2008, which states that

where the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than
that indicated in Article 4(1) or (2), an escape clause should provide that the law of
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It should be noted, however, that although liability arising out of the revocation of an
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on the basis of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, while liability arising out of the breach
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It follows that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not cover
freely assumed obligations by one party towards the other on the occasion
of the negotiations. However, that does not mean that Article 12 covers all
types of non-contractual obligations that arise at the negotiation stage. It
only covers matters presenting a direct link with the dealings prior to the
conclusion of a contract.
2. Culpa in Contrahendo Only Encompasses Non-Contractual Obligations
Presenting a Direct Link with the Dealings Prior to the Conclusion of a
Contract
In order to determine the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation, we have to construe the wording of this provision in accordance
with Recital 30 of the same Regulation. According to Recital 30 of the
Rome II Regulation,
Culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an
autonomous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within
the meaning of national law. It should include the violation of the
duty of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations.
Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct
link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. This
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers
personal injury, Article 4 or other relevant provisions of this
Regulation should apply.232

In light of this Recital, we are able to determine which non-contractual
obligations are excluded from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation, and which non-contractual obligations fall within its scope.
a. The Excluded Non-Contractual Obligations
Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation expressly excludes from the
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation the situations where the
negotiations only provide the contextual frame for the injury. 233 According
to this Recital, a physical injury that occurs at the negotiation stage is not
directly linked with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. In
this situation, the defendant‘s liability cannot be characterized as
precontractual, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, but falls within
the scope of the general rule provided by Article 4 of the Rome II
Regulation.
of a pollicitation is determined on the basis of the Rome I Regulation, which means that the
first law might be determined on the basis of Article 12 (2) whenever the lex contractus in
negotio cannot be determined.
232
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30.
233
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By excluding this type of liability from the scope of Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation, the European Legislature, no doubt, had in mind the
Bananenschale case of the German Supreme Court, 234 in which the court
held that a customer who had slipped on a banana skin in a department store
is entitled to compensation under the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.235
b. The Covered Non-Contractual Obligations
The concept of a non-contractual obligation ―arising out of dealings
prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ and presenting a direct link with such
dealings has not been defined in EPIL. Pending a definition of this concept,
we believe that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers two types of
situations: (1) liability arising out of a conduct that affects the formation of
the contract under negotiation; and (2) liability arising out of the breach of a
non-contractual duty or obligation whose existence is due to the dealings
prior to the conclusion of a contract.
i. Liability Arising Out of a Harmful Conduct That Affects the Formation of
the Contract Under Negotiation
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers liability that arises out of
a harmful conduct that affects the conclusion of the contract. This conduct,
which occurs prior to the conclusion of the contract, affects the formation of
the contract in two ways. It can either provoke the formation of the contract
or prevent it from entering into existence. 236
Culpa in contrahendo that provokes the formation of the contract
encompasses two situations. First, it encompasses the situation where culpa
in contrahendo provokes the conclusion of an invalid contract. This is the
case, for example, whenever the contract has been formed through duress,
misrepresentations or, because of the ―breach of a duty to disclose.‖237 In
this situation, the contract would not have come into existence had the
harmful conduct not occurred.
Second, it encompasses the situation where the defendant‘s conduct
has affected the substantial terms of the contract without necessarily leading
to its invalidity. In this situation, the contract would have still come into
existence had the harmful conduct not occurred, albeit on different terms.
234

See PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at

21.
235
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 527; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466,
note 30, Lagarde, supra note 33, at 591–92.
236
For a similar distinction, see J. Schmidt, La sanction de la faute précontractuelle,
RTD Civ. 1974 46; PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 732. See also DICKINSON,
supra note 48, at 529, where the author distinguishes between ―situations in which a contract
has actually been concluded‖ from situations where the ―claim is based on conduct of the
defendant that has prevented a contract from being concluded.‖
237
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526.
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The defendant‘s conduct has provoked the conclusion of a contract that is
less favorable to the plaintiff. This situation encompasses the violation of a
duty to disclose whereby full disclosure would have lead to the conclusion
of a different contract. It also encompasses the situation whereby
misrepresentations or duress do not lead to the invalidity of the contract but
to an alteration of its terms. 238
Culpa in contrahendo that prevents the formation of the contract
includes situations whereby the contract did not come into existence
because of the defendant‘s conduct. This is the case whenever the
defendant has unlawfully revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction),
or has broken off negotiations in bad faith (Examples 3 and 4 of the
Introduction). This last situation is provided by Recital 30 of the Rome II
Regulation, which states that Article 12 of the same Regulation should
include ―the breakdown of contractual negotiations.‖239
ii. Liability Arising Out of the Violation of Non-Contractual Duties and
Obligations Whose Existence Is Due to the Dealings Prior to the
Conclusion of a Contract
In some instances, one of the laws in conflict will place noncontractual duties and obligations upon the parties at the negotiation stage.
This is the case, for example, whenever one of the laws in conflict places
upon the parties a precontractual duty to disclose, a precontractual duty of
confidentiality, or a precontractual duty of good faith. Liability arising out
of the breach of such duties and obligations is covered by Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation.
These precontractual duties and obligations are characterized by two
specific traits. First, they are automatically placed upon parties who enter
into negotiations. Their existence is linked to that of dealings prior to the
conclusion of the contract. Such duties and obligations ought to be
distinguished from obligations arising out of preliminary agreements.
While an obligation that arises out of a preliminary agreement draws its
existence from the preliminary agreement that binds the parties, an
obligation arising from the mere fact that parties have entered into a
negotiation only exists because the parties have established a precontractual
relationship.
Second, in some exceptional instances, the lifespan of some of those
duties and obligations exceeds the timeframe of the negotiations. In effect,
some of these duties and obligations come into existence at the negotiation
stage but continue to be placed on the negotiating parties even after the
negotiations have ended. This is the case, for example, whenever national

238
239

See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46.
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30.
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laws place upon the parties a precontractual obligation of confidentiality. 240
While this obligation comes into existence at the negotiation stage, it
continues to bind the parties after the negotiations have ended. Thus,
liability arising out of the breach of a precontractual obligation of
confidentiality falls within the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation, even though such a breach might have occurred after the
negotiations have been broken off or after the contract under negotiation
has been concluded.
While this solution can seem a bit unorthodox, it ought to be upheld
for two reasons. First, it is in accordance with the wording of Article 12 of
the Rome II Regulation. Indeed, this provision covers ―non-contractual
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.‖241
The Legislature did not limit the material scope of this article to liability
arising out of a harmful conduct that occurs prior to the conclusion of a
contract. The application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation can be
triggered by the breach of a non-contractual obligation that has come into
existence during the parties‘ negotiations even though such an obligation
has been breached at a later time. Second, this solution helps achieve unity
and predictability by submitting all aspects of culpa in contrahendo to the
same law. It should, however, be noted that this situation, is, to our
knowledge, the only situation whereby the defendant‘s precontractual
liability does not arise out of a conduct that occurs during the negotiations
of a contract.
In summary, there are two types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a
contractual type of liability and a non-contractual type of precontractual
liability. Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers two types of
non-contractual precontractual liability. First, it covers liability arising out
of a conduct that has either provoked or prevented the formation of the
contract under negotiation. Second, it covers, liability arising out of the
breach of a non-contractual precontractual duty or obligation that has come
into existence at the negotiation stage. These two types of non-contractual
liability are governed by a law that is determined on the basis of a
contractual connecting factor.

240
See, e.g., Wet betreffende de precontractuele informatie bij commerciële
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten [Law on pre contractual information in commercial
cooperation agreements], Dec. 19, 2005, Belgisch staatsblad [B.S.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Jan. 18, 2006, available in English at http://www.eff-franchise.com/IMG/
pdf/Belgium_-_Franchise_Legislation_on_Precontractual_.pdf (providing, under Article 6,
―the parties are held to the confidentiality of the information that they obtain in view of the
conclusion of the agreement of commercial partnership, and may not use this information,
directly or indirectly, outside of the agreement of commercial partnership to be concluded.‖).
241
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art 12(1).
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II. THE CONTRACTUAL CONNECTING FACTOR OF CULPA IN
CONTRAHENDO IN EPIL
While the controversy caused by the non-contractual characterization
of precontractual liability is lively, 242 its scope is limited by the
Legislature‘s choice of applicable law.243 Two sets of rules have been
provided by the Legislature in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation: a
general rule and a subsidiary set of connecting factors. 244 These rules are
not mandatory and can be displaced by the parties who are given the
possibility to submit their precontractual liability to a law of their choice. 245
Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation allows the parties to submit noncontractual obligations to the law of their choice ―by an agreement entered
into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred‖ or ―where all the
parties are pursuing a commercial activity; by an agreement freely
negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred.‖246 Because
culpa in contrahendo is a type of non-contractual liability that falls within
the scope of the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to noncontractual obligations, 247 the parties can, on the basis of Article 14 of the
Rome II Regulation, decide to submit claims arising out of culpa in
contrahendo to a law that they have chosen.
This possibility is available to the parties whenever either one of the
following two conditions is met. First, the parties have the possibility to
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the law of their choice,
after the harmful conduct giving rise to the damage has occurred. In this
situation, the parties will agree to submit their precontractual relationship to
a retrospective law that will govern a situation that has occurred prior to the
party‘s agreement on the choice of law. Second, the parties can submit
their precontractual relationship to the law of their choice at the beginning
of their negotiations. This possibility is only open to parties that are
pursuing a commercial activity through their negotiations. This second
option is very convenient to sophisticated parties who are negotiating a
complex business transaction over a long period of time. 248
In effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides the default

242
This characterization has been severely criticized by German scholars. Cf. Thoma,
supra note 22, at 676–78; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 587.
243
Lagarde, supra note 33, at 591.
244
Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466; PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra
note 22, at 736; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 589–91; Thoma, supra note 22, at 681; Olivera
Boskovic, Règlement Rome II (Obligations non contractuelles), RDI 2010, 95, at 95–97.
245
See Pierre-Yves Gautier, Les aspects internationaux de la négociation, RTD Com.
493 (1998); Olivera Boskovic, L’autonomie de la volonté dans le règlement Rome II, D.
1639 (2009); Thoma, supra note 22, at 682.
246
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14.
247
See supra Part I.
248
See Gautier, supra note 245.
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rules that apply to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo whenever the
parties did not choose to submit such claims to the law of their choice. The
first limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides the general rule
applicable to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo. According to
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation
the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract, regardless of whether
the contract has been concluded or not, shall be the law that applies
to the contract or that would have been applicable to it had it been
entered into.249

By inserting this provision, the European Legislature has chosen to
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in
negotio, which is the law of the contract under negotiation, instead of the
lex delicti, which is the law normally applicable to non-contractual
obligations.250
The second limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides an
auxiliary rule, which determines subsidiary torts contacts that apply
whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be determined.
A. The General Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio to Claims
Arising out of Culpa in Contrahendo
The first limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation submits claims
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio, which
is the law of the contract under negotiation. 251 Because the lex contractus
in negotio governs a non-contractual situation, it plays the role that is
usually assigned to the lex delicti. In effect, the European Legislature has
borrowed the connecting factor of another EPIL category. Through this
course of action, the European Legislature was able to maintain the noncontractual characterization of culpa in contrahendo while determining the
applicable law on the basis of a contractual connecting factor.
In order to evaluate the Legislature‘s choice to submit claims arising
out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio, we must, first,
determine the applicable lex contractus in negotio.
1. The Determination of the Lex Contractus in Negotio
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation states that:
249

Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37.
The lex contractus in negotio is the law of the contract under negotiation.
251
This idea was initially suggested in France by Pierre Bourel. See PIERRE BOUREL, LES
CONFLITS DE LOI EN MATIÈRE D‘OBLIGATIONS EXTRACONTRACTUELLES (1961). It has also
been suggested by the Max Planck Institute Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and
Private International Law. See MAX PLANCK INST., COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 96.
250
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The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether
the contract was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that
applies to the contract or that would have been applicable to it had it
been entered into.252

Although Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation does not distinguish
between the situation where the contract under negotiation was actually
concluded and the situation where the contemplated contract was not
entered into, the determination of the lex contractus in negotio is greatly
affected by the outcome of the parties‘ negotiations. Depending on whether
the contract under negotiation was actually concluded or not, the lex
contractus in negotio will be the law of the concluded contract—the lex
contractus finalis—or the law of the putative contract—the lex contractus
putativus.
a. The Lex Contractus in Negotio is the Lex Contractus Finalis
Where culpa in contrahendo does not prevent the formation of the
contract, the applicable law to the precontractual liability arising out of the
defendant‘s conduct is the law that governs the concluded contract. This is
usually the case when the defendant‘s behavior has wrongfully provoked
the formation of an invalid contract or has altered some of its terms (see
Example 1 of the Introduction). This is the case, for example, when the
contract has been concluded through misrepresentations, breach of a duty to
disclose certain material facts, intimidation or duress. 253 Whenever this
situation arises, the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability
is the law that governs the concluded contract or the lex contractus
finalis.254
The lex contractus finalis is determined by reference to the Rome I
Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations. Unless the
concluded contract is a contract of carriage, a consumer contract, an
insurance contract or an employment contract, 255 the lex contractus finalis is
252

Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(1).
See DICKINSON, supra note 48 at 526; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46.
254
It should be noted that Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation submits the validity of
the contract to the law which would govern it if the contract were valid. According to
Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, ―[t]he existence and validity of a contract, or of any
term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this
Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38,
art. 10(1).
255
The law that governs these contracts is determined on the basis of special rules
provided by Articles 5–8 of the Rome I Regulation. According to Plender & Wilderspin,
253

the rules applicable to the categories of contracts falling within the scope of those
articles derogate both from art.3 of the Regulation, since they restrict party
autonomy to some extent, and art.4, since each of them establishes a different
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either directly chosen by the parties or determined by Article 4 of the Rome
I Regulation in the absence of such a choice.
i. The Lex Contractus Finalis is Chosen by the Parties
According to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, the lex contractus
can be chosen by the parties.256 This situation ought to be distinguished
from the one described by Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation, which
authorizes the parties to submit the non-contractual obligation arising out of
precontractual liability to the law of their choice. 257 In the first situation,
the parties have chosen to submit their contractual relationship to the law of
their choice. In the second situation, the parties have specifically submitted
their precontractual relationship to the law of their choice. 258 The
distinction between the two afore-mentioned situations is fundamental.
While Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation governs the parties‘
precontractual relationship in the first instance, its application is excluded in
the second scenario. It should be noted that the parties have the possibility
to submit their precontractual relationship to one law, and their contractual
relationship to another. 259

method for selecting the applicable law in the absence of party choice.
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77.
256
Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable
to the whole or to part only of the contract.
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 3. On party autonomy in the Rome I
Regulation, see PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77.
257
According to Article 14(1) of the Rome II Regulation
The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their
choice:
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage
occurred;
or
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an
agreement freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage
occurred.
The choice shall be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the
circumstances of the case and shall not prejudice the rights of third parties.
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14(1).
258
See Gautier, supra note 245; Boskovic, supra note 245.
259
See Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163.
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The law that is chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
relationship raises two issues whenever its application is extended to their
precontractual relationship.
First, the choice of law by the parties raises the issue of the validity of
the choice of law clause. Whenever culpa in contrahendo has provoked the
conclusion of the contract through misrepresentation or duress, it is very
likely that it has also provoked the conclusion of the choice of law clause.
In such a case, the issue of the validity of the choice of law clause must be
resolved prior to the determination of the applicable law to precontractual
liability. According to Article 3(5) of the Rome 1 Regulation, this issue is
to be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11, and 13
of the same Regulation.260
Second, an unresolved issue arises whenever the parties have chosen to
submit different parts of the concluded contract to different laws. Article
3(1) of the Rome I Regulation261 allows voluntary dépeçage262 of the
contract by the parties who can agree to submit only part of the contract to
the law of their choice. According to this provision, the parties can choose
a law to govern one part of their contract while the other part will be
governed by another law that is either chosen by them or left undetermined.
Whenever the parties have resorted to the voluntary dépeçage of the
contract, an issue arises as to the determination of the law that ought to
govern their precontractual relationship.
The Rome II Regulation does not provide the answer to this question.
It would seem that this issue can be resolved in one of three ways. The first
solution would be to disregard the parties‘ choice of law whenever they
submit their contract to different laws, and apply the rules provided by
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, which determine the law that governs
the concluded contract in the absence of a choice of law by the parties. The
second solution would be to submit precontractual liability to the law that
governs the existence or the validity of the concluded contract because of
the very close correlation between the contract‘s validity and the
defendant‘s precontractual liability. 263 The third possibility would be to
consider that the lex contractus in negotio cannot be determined and to
determine the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo on the basis of Article
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation.

260

―The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the
applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and
13.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 3(5).
261
See DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46.
262
Dépeçage refers to the concept whereby different issues within a particular case may
be governed by the laws of different states. According to Black‘s Law Dictionary, dépecage
designates ―a court‘s application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute;
choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (2009).
263
See infra Part II(A)(2)(a).
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ii. The Lex Contractus Finalis in the Absence of a Choice of Law by the
Parties
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties, Article 4 of the Rome
I Regulation provides the applicable law.264 This provision establishes a
―general regime for determining the applicable law in the absence of party
264

Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation states that

1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in
accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law
governing the contract shall be determined as follows:
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country
where the seller has his habitual residence;
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the
country where the service provider has his habitual residence;
(c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or to a tenancy
of immovable property shall be governed by the law of the country where the
property is situated;
(d) notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded for
temporary private use for a period of no more than six consecutive months
shall be governed by the law of the country where the landlord has his
habitual residence, provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his
habitual residence in the same country;
(e) a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the
franchisee has his habitual residence;
(f) a distribution contract shall be governed by the law of the country where
the distributor has his habitual residence;
(g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall be governed by the law of
the country where the auction takes place, if such a place can be determined;
(h) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings together or
facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling
interests in financial instruments, as defined by Article 4(1), point (17) of
Directive 2004/39/EC, in accordance with non-discretionary rules and
governed by a single law, shall be governed by that law.
2. Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the
contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to
effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.
4. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2,
the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most
closely connected.
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4.
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choice.‖265 Its application is without prejudice to Articles 5,266 6,267 7,268
and 8269 of the Rome I Regulation, ―which establish special rules for
selecting the applicable law in the case of contracts of carriage, consumer
contracts, insurance contracts and employment contracts.‖270
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation establishes a system of jurisdictionselecting rules271 that can be displaced in favor of the law that has the
closest connection to the contract.
(1) The Jurisdiction-Selecting Rules
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides a general rule and
―specific rules that determine the applicable law in eight types of
contracts.‖272 The general rule is provided by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of
the Rome I Regulation, and applies whenever the contract in question does
not fall within the list of contracts enumerated by paragraph 1, or where the
elements of the contract would be covered by more than one special rule
provided for in paragraph 1.273 According to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the
Rome I Regulation, the contract is governed by the law of the ―country of
the habitual residence of the party required to effect the characteristic
performance of the contract.‖274 In other words, the contract is governed by
the law of the habitual residence 275 of the debtor of the characteristic
performance.276

265

PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77.
Article 5 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to contacts of carriage.
Id. art. 5.
267
Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to consumer contracts.
Id. art. 6.
268
Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to insurance contracts.
Id. art. 7.
269
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable to individual employment
contracts. Id. art. 8.
270
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77.
271
A jurisdiction-selecting rule is a choice of law rule that designates the applicable law
―on the basis of the physical contacts of the involved states (‗jurisdiction-selection‘), without
regard to the content of their substantive laws.‖ Symeonides, supra note 42, at 181. It should
not be confused with the choice of jurisdiction rule that determines the competence of the
seized court in matters related to conflicts of jurisdictions.
272
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. For the text of the provision, see
supra note 264.
273
See supra, note 264.
274
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(2).
275
Article 19 of the Rome I Regulation and Article 23 of the Rome II Regulation define
the habitual residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, as the
place of central administration and the habitual residence of a natural person acting in the
course of his business activity as his principal place of business. Council Regulation
593/2008, supra note 38, art. 19; Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 23.
276
The concept of characteristic performance is defined as being the performance for
266
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The application of this general rule is set aside whenever the
concluded contract falls within one of the categories enumerated by
paragraph 1. In this situation, the specific rules enumerated by this
paragraph determine the applicable law. 277
(2) The Law That Has the Closest Connection to the Contract
Articles 4(3) and 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation provide a ―residual
role for the connecting factor of the closest connection to the contract‖.278
According to Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, the law that has the
closest connection to the contract should apply in two situations.
First, courts may determine the applicable law to the contract by
searching for the closest connection whenever the lex contractus cannot be
determined by virtue of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation.
Indeed, Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation states that ―[w]here the law
applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected.‖279
Second, Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation provides an escape
clause that allows departure from the rules established in paragraphs 1 and 2
of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. According to this provision,
―[w]here it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated
in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.‖280 In effect,
whenever it appears that the contract might be more closely connected to
another country than to the country of the habitual residence of the debtor
of the characteristic performance, the law of that country shall apply. This
mechanism is similar to the presumption method adopted by the Second
Restatement. However, the application of this escape clause should be used
in certain cases and only where it is manifestly clear that the contract is

which payment is due. While such a criterion can help define most characteristic
performances, it is insufficient for identifying the characteristic performance when no
payment is due. See Andrea Bonomi, The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations—Some General Remarks, 10 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2008); Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, Applicable Law in the
Absence of Choice to Contracts Relating to Intellectual or Industrial Property Rights, 10
YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2008); PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra
note 22, at 188.
277
It should be noted that, in most of the cases falling under paragraph 1 of Article 4 of
the Rome I Regulation, the application of the special rule leads to the result that would have
been reached by the application of the general rule contained in paragraph 2. See PLENDER
& WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 178.
278
Id. at 194.
279
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(4).
280
Id. art. 4(3). For the full text of this article, see supra note 60.
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more closely connected to the law of another country. 281
In summary, whenever the contract has been concluded, the lex
contractus in negotio might be one of five laws: (1) the law that is
designated on the basis of Articles 5–8 of the Rome I Regulation whenever
the concluded contract falls into one of the categories of contracts
enumerated by these Articles; (2) the law chosen by the parties to govern
the concluded contract; (3) the law provided by Article 4(1) of the Rome I
regulation whenever the contract falls into one of the categories of contracts
enumerated by this paragraph; (4) the law of the habitual residence of the
debtor of the characteristic performance; or (5) the law that has the closest
connection to the contract. On the other hand, whenever the contract under
negotiation did not come into existence, the lex contractus in negotio is the
lex contractus putativus.
b. The Lex Contractus in Negotio is the Lex Contractus Putativus
Where the contract under negotiation did not come into existence, the
law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability is the law of the
putative contract282 or the lex contractus putativus. This is usually the case
when culpa in contrahendo has prevented the conclusion of the contract
under negotiation. In this situation, the defendant‘s behavior will have
prevented the contract under negotiation from coming into existence. This
is the case, for example, when the defendant has broken off negotiations in
bad faith (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction), or when he has
prematurely revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction). 283
Whenever such situations arise, the law that governs the defendant‘s
precontractual liability is the law of the contract under negotiation had it
been entered into.
The application of the law of the putative contract to the parties‘
precontractual relationship raises three issues. First, this law can never
result from the application of a choice of law clause that was contained in a
draft contract which has been rejected.284 The absence of an agreement on
the applicable law is evident in this situation and we cannot apply the law
designated by a choice of law clause that was proposed by one party during
negotiations and that has not been accepted by the other. To hold
otherwise, would unfairly surprise the party who did not agree to the choice
of law clause proposed by the other. The application of the choice of law
clause is especially unfair whenever the disagreement over the choice of
281

PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 196.
The term ―law of the putative contract‖ is used by several scholars. See, e.g., H. Muir
Watt, De la loi applicable à un contrat tacitement accepté, Rev. Crit. DIP 1995 300, 304–05
(referring to ―la loi putative du contrat‖); Gautier, supra note 245 at 496; Volders, First
Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; Thoma, supra note 22, at 681.
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law clause has triggered the break off of negotiations. 285 It follows that the
applicable law to the putative contract should always be determined on the
basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 286
Second, the lex contractus putativus raises the issue of the
determination of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the
contract. While the determination of the debtor of the characteristic
performance of the contract is relatively easy in cases where culpa in
contrahendo does not prevent the conclusion of the negotiated contract, this
determination, while still possible, can prove to be somewhat problematic
whenever the negotiations are broken off at an early stage.287
Third, the lex contractus putativus raises objections as to its legitimate
application. Indeed, the parties in an international negotiation did not agree
to the contract and yet find their relationship governed by the law of a
contract to which they did not adhere. This is especially unfair to the
defendant who has expressly rejected the contract under negotiation by
breaking off negotiations (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction) or by
revoking the offer (Example 2 of the Introduction). In such cases, the
application of the lex contractus putativus appears to be purely fictitious
and with no apparent legitimacy.288 On the other hand, it might also be
argued that the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the conclusion of the
contract and therefore has a legitimate right to the application of the law
that would have governed the contract had it been entered into. 289
In summary, the lex contractus putativus is one of four laws: (1) the
law provided by Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Rome I Regulation whenever the
contemplated contract falls into one of the categories of contracts that are
designated by one of these Articles; (2) the law provided by Article 4(1) of
the Rome I regulation whenever the contemplated contract falls into one of
the categories of contracts enumerated by this paragraph; (3) the law of the
285

PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736–37.
It should be noted, however, that some scholars have argued for the application, in
this case, of the rules provided by Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation. Such a solution
seems to contradict the wording of the text, which subjects the application of these rules to
situations where the lex contractus putativus cannot be determined. This is clearly not the
case whenever a draft contract contains a choice of law clause that has not been accepted by
both parties. In that case, the applicable law must be determined on the basis of Article 4 of
the Rome I regulation. This view is supported by Plender and Wilderspin who argue that
―any choice of law clause proposed by one party but not accepted by the other is clearly
irrelevant as a pointer to the applicable law [. . .] Thus, provided that it is possible to
ascertain the law applicable to the putative contract by objective means, that law should be
applicable to the question of precontractual liability.‖ PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note
22, at 737; see also, Bollée, supra note 67, at ¶ 8.
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See infra Part II(B)(2).
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habitual residence of the debtor of the contemplated characteristic
performance; or (4) the law that would have had the closest connection to
the contract had it been entered into.
The lex contractus putativus ought to be distinguished from the lex
contractus finalis for the following reasons. First, the lex contractus
putativus applies whenever the contract under negotiation did not come into
existence, while the lex contractus finalis applies whenever the contract
under negotiation has been concluded. Second, the lex contractus putativus
can never result from the application of a choice of law clause that is
contained in the draft contract which has been rejected, while the lex
contractus finalis can be designated by the choice of law clause contained
in the concluded contract. 290 Third, the law of the place of residence of the
debtor of the characteristic performance might prove to be harder to identify
when it is the lex contractus putativus.291
2. The Appraisal of the Lex Contractus in Negotio
By submitting claims arising out of precontractual liability to the lex
contractus in negotio, the European Legislature has sought to unify and
simplify the determination of the applicable law. In order to offer an
assessment of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation,
we must first analyze the results reached by its application.
a. The Analysis of the Results Reached by Application of the Lex
Contractus in Negotio.
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has chosen to submit claims
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio. The
issue that we aim to discuss in this part of the essay is whether the rule
provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation reaches favorable
results every time a claim involving culpa in contrahendo is brought before
a court of a member state. Our aim is not to offer an appraisal of the
application of the lex contractus in negotio in every possible scenario where
the plaintiff seeks to establish the defendant‘s precontractual liability, but to
determine whether the need to displace the lex contractus in negotio ever
arises.
A priori, it might be argued that it is completely inappropriate to
determine the precontractual liability of the defendant by application of the
law of the contract under negotiation for two reasons. First, the application
of the lex contractus finalis to the defendant‘s precontractual liability might
upset the parties‘ expectations. It might be argued that the parties could not
have foreseen, at the time the contract was under negotiation, the
application of the law governing their contractual relationship to their
290
291

See supra Part II(A)(1)(a).
See infra Part II(B)(2).
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precontractual relationship. In this situation, the lex contractus finalis
operates retrospectively, as it applies to a situation that has, chronologically,
preceded the existence of the contract.
Second, the application of the lex contractus putativus to the
defendant‘s precontractual liability whenever the contract under negotiation
was not entered into might appear to be even more inappropriate. In this
situation the parties‘ precontractual relationship is governed by the
applicable law to a fictitious contract. The contract under negotiation did
not come into existence and yet its law governs the defendant‘s
precontractual liability. This is especially unfair to the defendant who has
expressly rejected the contract under negotiation by breaking off
negotiations (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction) or by revoking his offer
(Example 2 of the Introduction). In this case, the application of the lex
contractus putativus appears to be purely fictitious with no apparent
legitimacy.292
Although these arguments might seem logical, their generalization
ought to be avoided. While it is true that in some situations the application
of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation might
unfairly surprise the parties, we cannot assume that the application of the
lex contractus in negotio reaches inappropriate results every time a court is
faced with a claim arising out of precontractual liability. In order to
determine the efficiency of the rule we must, according to S. Symeonides,
―examine the results the rule produces in several typical patterns formed by
the aggregation or disbursement of the pertinent contacts . . . and the
content of the laws of each contact state.‖293 Therefore, we will examine
the results reached by the application of the lex contractus in negotio in two
situations: the situation where the validity of the contract affects the
defendant‘s precontractual liability and the situation where the two issues
are not intertwined.
i. The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio
Whenever the Existence or the Validity of the Contract Affects the
Defendant’s Precontractual Liability
Whenever the validity or the existence of the contract affects the
defendant‘s precontractual liability, the two issues ought to be governed by
the same law. This situation arises whenever the laws in conflict take
different positions as to the validity or the existence of the contract. In this
situation, displacing the lex contractus in negotio ought to be discouraged
292

Contra Légier, supra note 63, at 155. The author finds the application of the law of
the contemplated contract to be in line with Articles 10 and 11 of the Rome II Regulation as
well as with the national laws of some of the member states. It can also be argued that, in
this situation, the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the conclusion of the contract and,
therefore, has a legitimate right to the application of its law.
293
Symeonides, supra note 42, at188.

508

Culpa in Contrahendo in European Private International Law
32:451 (2012)

as it might lead to incoherent and unfair results. Two examples help
illustrate this point:
Example A: The first example is an example of culpa in contrahendo
that has provoked the formation of the contract through misrepresentations
(see Example 1 of the Introduction) or duress. This is a case where the
plaintiff seeks to void the contract and seeks damages for the defendant‘s
wrongful behavior. In this situation, the laws that are in conflict provide for
different rules as to the validity of the contract and as to the defendant‘s
precontractual liability. According to the first law, the contract is invalid
and the defendant is liable for harm caused by the conclusion of the invalid
contract. According to the second law, the contract is valid and the
defendant is exonerated from any liability. In this situation, each law has
established a coherent system where the validity of the contract affects the
defendant‘s liability. Indeed, under the first law (law of state A), the
invalidity of the contract is usually accompanied by the defendant‘s
liability. On the other hand, application of the second law (law of state B)
will validate the contract, thus exonerating the defendant from liability.
The use of dépeçage in this case will lead to one of two incoherent results
that upset the carefully established balance of the provisions of the two laws
in conflict.
Under the first result, the contract is void by application of the first law
(law of state A) to the issue of validity; but the defendant will escape
liability by application of the second law (law of state B) to the issue of
precontractual liability. The simultaneous application of these two laws
will establish an incoherent situation between the parties. Under this result,
the contract is void although the defendant‘s conduct that has provoked its
conclusion is lawful. Such a result ought to be avoided as it frustrates the
interests of both states whose laws are in conflict as well as the parties‘
expectations.
First, this result will frustrate the deterrence interests of state A. This
state has an interest in deterring unlawful conducts that provoke the
formation of an invalid contract. According to the law of state A, the
invalidity of the contract does not suffice, by itself, to reach the desired
level of deterrence, which is why the defendant is held precontractually
liable for his conduct. The application of state B‘s law will greatly hinder
state A‘s deterrence interests by exonerating the defendant from
precontractual liability. Furthermore, state A‘s interest in compensating the
plaintiff whose expectations have been thwarted by the defendant‘s
conduct, will be severely impaired by the application of state B‘s law. In
effect, the plaintiff will be deprived of the benefits of the contract and of the
benefits of liability.
Second, state B‘s interest in validating the contract is severely
impaired by the application of state A‘s law. State B exonerates the
defendant from precontractual liability and provides a conduct-liberating
rule that salvages the contract. It has provided a conduct-liberating rule at
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the negotiation stage in order to encourage commercial transactions
between the two parties. The application of state A‘s law to the validity of
the contract severely impairs, state B‘s interest in liberating the parties‘
conduct during negotiations.
Third, this result is unfair to both parties. While the plaintiff will be
deprived of the benefits of the contract without reaping the benefits of
liability, the defendant is deprived of the benefits of the contract for acting
in conformity with the law that governs his precontractual liability. In
effect, the defendant will be deprived of the benefits of the contract for
acting lawfully!
Under the second result, the contract is deemed valid by application of
the second law (law of state B) but the defendant will be held liable by
application of the first law (law of state A). The simultaneous application
of these two laws will establish an incoherent situation between the parties.
Under this result, the contract is valid although the defendant‘s conduct that
has provoked its conclusion is unlawful. Such a result ought to be avoided
as it frustrates the interests of both states whose laws are in conflict as well
as the parties‘ expectations.
First, this result severely impairs state B‘s conduct-liberating interests
at the negotiation stage. State B wants to encourage commercial initiatives
by giving the parties the freedom to negotiate without constraints.
However, the application of State A‘s law to the defendant‘s precontractual
liability goes against state B‘s conduct-liberating policies. What is given by
one hand is taken away by the other. The application of state A‘s law to the
defendant‘s precontractual liability will have the opposite effects. Aware of
his potential precontractual liability, the defendant will think twice before
initiating negotiations, which will hinder state B‘s conduct-liberating
policies.
Second, this result will greatly hinder state A‘s interest in regulating
contract formation. This state has an interest in invalidating contracts that
were wrongfully concluded.
The reason behind the defendant‘s
precontractual liability is to deter the formation of wrongfully concluded
contracts, in order to protect the plaintiff from the effects of a contract that
is deemed unfair. The application of state B‘s law to the validity of the
contract severely impairs the protection bestowed upon the plaintiff who is,
according to state A, still bound by an unlawful contract.
Third, this result is extremely unfair to the defendant who will be
bound to a contract that was legally concluded, while being liable to the
plaintiff for a conduct that has been deemed unlawful by the other law. On
the other hand, this result unfairly benefits the plaintiff who will retain the
benefit of the contract in addition to the benefits of liability.
Example B: The second example is an example of culpa in
contrahendo that prevents the contract under negotiation from coming into
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existence.294 This is the case, for example, when the defendant revokes his
offer and the plaintiff seeks to confirm the existence of the contract in spite
of the defendant‘s revocation, while, subsidiarily, seeking damages from
the defendant who has revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction).
In this situation, the laws that are in conflict provide for different rules as to
the effects of the offer‘s revocation and as to the defendant‘s precontractual
liability. According to the first law (law of state C), the revocation of the
offer does not prevent the contract from coming into existence, while
according to the second law (law of state D), the revocation of the offer
prevents the formation of the contract but renders the defendant liable. In
this situation, each law has established a coherent system whereby the
formation of the contract affects the defendant‘s liability. Under the law of
state C, the formation of the contract exonerates the defendant from
precontractual liability. On the other hand, application of the law of state D
precludes the formation of the contract while rendering the defendant liable.
The use of dépeçage in this case will lead to one of two incoherent results
that upset the carefully established balance of the provisions of each law.
Under the first result, the contract is valid by application of the law of
state C, while the defendant will be held liable by application of the law of
state D. In this situation, the use of dépeçage, renders the defendant liable
for preventing the conclusion of a contract that has been deemed concluded
by the same court. This absurd result alone ought to discourage the use of
dépeçage in this case. It should be noted that this result is purely theoretical
and can never be reached in practice. 295
Under the second result, the revocation of the offer prevents the
conclusion of the contract by application of the law of state D, whilst the
defendant is exonerated from liability by application of the law of state C.
This result ought to be rejected for the following reasons.
First, this result frustrates the interests of both states whose laws are in
conflict. State D has an interest in protecting the plaintiff by deterring the
unlawful revocation of the offer. While this state does not want to ensure
the formation of the contract, it seeks to enforce its conduct-regulating
policies at the negotiation stage by holding the defendant liable for
unlawfully revoking his offer. The application of the law of state C to the
defendant‘s precontractual liability severely impairs these interests.
Moreover, the application of the law of state C to the defendant‘s
precontractual liability goes against state C‘s own interests. Indeed, this
state seeks to protect the plaintiff by binding the offeror to the contract he
has offered to conclude. The law of state C only excludes the defendant‘s
precontractual liability because it deems he is contractually liable towards
294

Although technically in this case culpa in contrahendo has not prevented the contract
from coming into existence under one of the laws in conflict.
295
Usually, the seized court will not examine the plaintiff‘s subsidiary claim whenever it
has ruled in his favor on the first claim.
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the plaintiff. In effect, the interests of this state will be better served by the
application of the law of state D to the defendant‘s precontractual liability.
Second, this result is completely unfair to the plaintiff, who is deprived
of the benefits of the contract and of compensation, even though he is the
party whose protection is sought by the two laws. On the other hand, the
defendant is unrightfully exonerated of liability. Although his conduct is
considered to be unlawful by the two laws that are in conflict, it is validated
by the untimely use of dépeçage.
In summary, the use of dépeçage will benefit the wrongdoer, to the
detriment of the interests of the states whose laws are in conflict, and to the
detriment of the plaintiff who has a legitimate right to benefit from the
protection that is bestowed upon him by these laws. Thus, it would be
inappropriate to displace the application of the lex contractus in negotio
whenever the defendant‘s precontractual liability is affected by the issue of
contract validity.
ii. The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in
Negotio Whenever the Existence or the Validity of the Contract Does Not
Affect the Defendant’s Precontractual Liability
The existence or validity of the contract is not at issue whenever the
laws in conflict provide the same answer to the question of the contract‘s
existence or validity. Two examples help illustrate this scenario.
The first example is an example of culpa in contrahendo that has
altered the terms of the concluded contract without affecting its validity
(Example 1of the Introduction). In this case, the contract is deemed valid
by the laws of the two countries closely connected to the issue, but only one
of the laws in conflict awards damages to the plaintiff.296
The second example is an example of culpa in contrahendo that has
prevented the formation of the contract by the breaking off of negotiations
(Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction). In this case, both laws in conflict
consider the contract to be non-existent, but only one of the laws in conflict
awards damages to the plaintiff for the breach of the precontractual duty of
good faith.
In order to determine whether the application of the lex contractus in
negotio reaches favorable results in the above-mentioned scenarios, we
must evaluate its application in three cases: the case where the lex
contractus in negotio is chosen by the parties, the case where the lex
contractus in negotio is determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation,297 and the case where it is determined by employment of the
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This would be the case in France where the defendant can be held liable for
misrepresentations that alter the terms of the contract without voiding it. TERRÉ, supra note
4, at 238.
297
See supra Part II(A)(1).
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escape clause.
(1) The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio
That Is Chosen by the Parties
Whenever the lex contractus in negotio is the law chosen by the parties
to govern their contractual relationship, the issue is whether such a law is
equally appropriate to govern their precontractual relationship. This
situation only arises whenever the contract under negotiation has already
been entered into and the parties have chosen to submit their contract to a
law of their choice.298 Because of the freedom given to the parties in the
choice of the law that governs the concluded contract, the results reached by
application of this law to precontractual liability can vary greatly. While
the application of the choice of law clause to precontractual liability can
produce favorable results, it can also result in an inappropriate outcome.
The main argument against the application of the choice of law clause
provided in the contract is that the parties did not intend to submit their
precontractual relationship to such a law, but have only chosen this law to
govern their contractual relationship. This situation is not to be confused
with the one described in Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation. According
to this article, the parties have the possibility to submit their precontractual
relationship to the law of their choice either before or after the event giving
rise to the damage occurs. 299 Whenever the parties have not expressly
chosen to submit their precontractual liability to the law of their choice, we
cannot assume that they have intended to submit their precontractual
relationship to the law that governs their contractual relationship. This is
especially true whenever the parties did not even consider the issue of
precontractual liability.300 Furthermore, the choice of law clause contained
in the contract might lead to the application of the law of a state that is very
loosely connected to the parties‘ precontractual relationship. This is the

298
299

See supra Part II(A)(1).
According to Article 14(1) of the Rome II Regulation:

The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their
choice:
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred;
or
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement
freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred.‖
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14(1).
300
It should be noted that, whenever the validity of the contract and the precontractual
liability of the defendant are intertwined, the application of the choice of law clause will not
unfairly surprise the parties who have agreed to submit the validity of the contract to this
law.
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case, for example, whenever the parties choose to submit their contract to
the law of the place of performance, which does not coincide with either
party‘s place of residence, the place of harm, the place of the conduct or the
place where the parties‘ precontractual relationship is centered. In this
situation, all the relevant contacts 301 are not located in the country of
performance of the contract, which is, arguably, less interested in regulating
the parties‘ precontractual liability than the law of the state of the habitual
residence of one of the parties. 302
(2) The Results Reached by Application of Lex Contractus in Negotio That
Is Not Chosen by the Parties
When the parties did not, 303 or could not,304 choose to submit the
contract under negotiation to a particular law, the lex contractus in negotio
is to be determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. This
law can be determined either on the basis of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 of
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 305 Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation
determines the applicable law whether the contract under negotiation has
been concluded or not. However, assessing the results of the application of
the lex contractus in negotio in all these situations would prove too long a
task for the purposes of this essay. Therefore, we have decided to evaluate
the need to displace the application of the lex contractus in negotio only in
the situation where the defendant has broken off negotiations, thus
preventing the parties‘ contemplated contract from coming into existence.
In this situation, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus
putativus, or the law of the putative contract.
We will assess the results of the application of the lex contractus
putativus in two situations. The first situation is the one where the
contemplated contract is governed by the rule provided by Article 4(2) of
the Rome I Regulation. The second situation is the one described by
Example 4 of the Introduction, 306 and where the contemplated contract is a
contract for the sale of land.
(a) The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus In Negotio
That Is Determined on the Basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation
When the contemplated contract is governed by the rule provided by

301

The place of the conduct, the place of injury, the place of negotiation, and the place of
the respective residences of the parties. See supra Part II(A)(1).
302
Unless it is argued that, since the defendant‘s conduct has altered the conditions of
performance of the contract, the place of performance has a conduct-regulating interest.
303
When the contract under negotiation has been concluded.
304
When the contract under negotiation has not been concluded.
305
See supra Part II(A)(1).
306
See supra Introduction.
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Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, the law that governs the parties‘
precontractual liability is the law of the habitual residence of the debtor of
the characteristic performance of the contemplated contract. 307
The application of the rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome I
Regulation reaches favorable results in the following cases. (1) The case
where both parties are residents of the same country. This situation is often
characterized as a false conflict usually governed by the law of the common
residence of the parties.308 (2) The case where the defendant is residing in a
country that holds him liable for precontractual liability, whereas the
plaintiff is residing in a country that exonerates the defendant. This case is
usually characterized as an unprovided-for case, to which the law of the
residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance might be well
suited. Indeed, the application of this law is fair to both parties who should
have relied on its application whenever they are conducting business. (3) It
might also be argued that the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II
Regulation is equally suitable in true conflicts situations where all the
conflicting laws have an interest in the application of their respective
laws.309 It might be argued that the law of the place of residence of the
debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract coincides with the
parties‘ expectations. On one hand, the debtor has, most likely, relied on
the law of his habitual residence in order to conduct his business, while, on
the other hand, the creditor, who is likely seeking the services of the debtor,
should be aware of the potential application of the law of the debtor‘s
habitual residence.310 While this argument can be made in most cases
involving a true conflict situation, it has been argued that the application of
the lex contractus in negotio
could impose on one of the contracting parties the stricter
requirements of the law of the place of habitual residence of the
other contracting party in the precontractual stage despite the fact
that the contract may not be eventually concluded or has not been
concluded. Such outcome is neither fair nor efficient as it creates
legal obstacles to the initiative of the parties to engage in contractual
negotiations.311

This might be the case in the scenario described by Example 3 of the
Introduction. In this example, a U.K. resident has broken off negotiations
with a French resident who is the debtor of the characteristic performance
307

See supra Part II(A)(1).
See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
309
The distinction between, false conflicts, true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases was
first suggested by Brainerd Currie. For a summary of Currie‘s theories, see WILLIAM M.
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78 (2002).
310
See Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 713.
311
Thoma, supra note 22, at 682.
308
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of the contract. This is a true conflict situation whereby each law in conflict
can claim jurisdiction. According to U.K. law, which does not impose a
precontractual duty of good faith, 312 the defendant is not liable, while under
French law the defendant is liable for the violation of the precontractual
duty of good faith.313 According to article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation,
this issue is governed by French law, which is the law of the habitual
residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract.
While this law has an interest in regulating the parties‘ conduct during the
negotiations of a contract and in protecting its residents from an abrupt
break off of negotiations, the application of French law is objectionable for
the following reasons.
First, the U.K. has an ―aleatory view‖ of negotiations: ―a party that
enters negotiations in the hope of the gain that will result from the final
agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if the other party breaks
off the negotiations‖.314 According to Professor Farnsworth, ―this aleatory
view of negotiations rests on a concern that limiting the freedom of
negotiation might discourage parties from entering negotiations.‖315 In this
instance, the defendant has probably broken off negotiations because he has
received a better offer from another seller. To hold him liable for seeking
to optimize his profits would severely impair the U.K.‘s conduct-liberating
interests. Indeed, the U.K.‘s policy of optimizing the distribution of riches
will be greatly hindered by the application of French law.
Second, while France may have an interest in deterring the break off of
negotiations in bad faith and in protecting its residents from economic loss,
we cannot impose on one contracting party the stricter requirements of the
law of the place of residency of the other party, when the contract under
negotiation has not been concluded. To hold otherwise would violate the
rules of comity and allow one country to extend its imperialistic views to
non-residents.
Third, the application of the lex contractus in negotio is unfair to the
defendant who has relied in good faith on the law of his residence in order
to break off negotiations. While it might be argued that he should have
foreseen the application of the law of the habitual residence of the debtor of
the characteristic performance of the contemplated contract, it would be
unfair to subject him to the law of a contract that he has expressly rejected.
Fourth, the plaintiff‘s expectations are not completely thwarted by the
displacement of the law of the contract under negotiation. As a business
man, he has to bear the risks of his endeavors. While he may have a right to
rely on the law of his habitual residence, he cannot be unfairly surprised by
312

Cf. Banakas, supra note 16; Musy, supra note 16; Powell, supra note 21, at 38.
Chambre commerciale et financière [Cass. Com.] [Commercial and financial court],
22 avril 1997, D. 1998, 45, note Patrick Chauvel (Fr.); Schmidt supra note 1, at 46.
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the application of the law of the habitual residence of the person he is
conducting business with and coincidentally, the law of the place of
performance of the contemplated contract.
While the above-mentioned example illustrates some of the unfair
results to which the application of the rule provided by Article 12(1) might
lead, it does not provide conclusive evidence in favor of displacing the lex
contractus in negotio. In fact, an argument can always be made in favor of
the application of the lex contractus in negotio whenever it is the law of the
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance. This
hesitation stems from the choice of contact that is used to determine the
applicable law whenever the lex contractus in negotio is determined on the
basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation. Whatever view is taken as
to the appropriateness of the lex contractus in negotio when it is determined
on the basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, this next situation
will provide conclusive evidence in favor of the need to provide escape
devices that allow the displacement of the lex contractus in negotio.
(b) The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in
Negotio That Is Determined on the Basis of Article 4(1)(c) of the Rome I
Regulation
Example 4 of the introduction gives a clear illustration of the
deficiencies of the lex contractus in negotio. In this situation, the American
defendant has broken off negotiations with a U.K. plaintiff for the sale of
land located in Germany. Because the parties‘ contemplated contract is a
contract for the sale of land, it falls within one of the categories of contracts
enumerated by paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is
governed by German law which is the ―law of the country where the
property is situated.‖316 Thus, according to German law, the defendant is
liable for breaking off the negotiations in bad faith. 317
The application of German law in this case is completely inappropriate
and should be displaced for the following reasons.
First, Germany has arguably no interest in regulating a case of
precontractual liability which does not involve any of its residents and
which has occurred entirely outside of its borders. While Germany might
have an interest in deterring a conduct that occurs within its borders or in
compensating a German victim that suffers an injury from the break off of
negotiations, it has no interest in applying its law when all the negotiating
parties are not residents of Germany and when the negotiations are held
entirely outside of Germany. Moreover, Germany has no immediate reason
to deter a conduct that has occurred outside its borders and that has caused

316
317

Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1).
Cf. Banakas, supra note 16; Musy, supra note 16.
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an injury to a non-resident of Germany. 318 In this case, the application of
German law is triggered by a completely fictitious contact that bares no
relationship to the issue at hand. Indeed, the application of German law is
triggered by the situs of a property that was to be the subject matter of a
contemplated contract that never came into existence.
Second, while it might be argued that, by imposing a precontractual
duty of good faith on the parties, Germany has an interest in protecting the
owners of German property during the negotiations of a contract for the sale
of land located in Germany, the application of German law in this particular
situation harms the defendant who owns the land. In this particular case,
the party that broke off the negotiations is the owner of the property, whose
protection is sought by German Legislature. In effect, the application of
German law goes against its protective policies, by rendering liable the very
person it has sought to protect. The present case ought to be distinguished
from the situation where the potential buyer of land breaks off negotiations
with the owner. In this latter situation, the application of German law
renders the potential buyer of land liable towards the owner, thus protecting
the owner of land in Germany from injury arising out of the breach of the
precontractual duty of good faith.
Third, whatever view is taken as to the existence of German interests
in this case, it cannot be argued that Germany‘s interests outweigh the
interests of the United Kingdom or the United States. On the contrary, the
application of German law severely impairs the interests of the countries of
residence of both parties. Indeed, both, the United Kingdom and the United
States do not impose a precontractual duty of good faith during the
negotiations of a contract.319 Both countries have an interest in liberating
conduct during negotiations and in encouraging commercial initiatives. It
would be unwise to allow Germany to impose its policies on other states
when the situation is so loosely connected to Germany.
Fourth, the application of German law frustrates the parties‘ justified
expectations. The defendant is unfairly surprised by the application of
German law in this situation. He has relied on the law of the place of his
habitual residence in order to break off negotiations. While he may have
foreseen the applicability of the law of the habitual residence of the
potential buyer of land, he did not account for the application of the law of
the situs of a property whose ownership is not an issue in this case. We
cannot expect the defendant‘s precontractual liability to be governed by the
law of the place where he owns property when the ownership of this
318

And who is not of German nationality.
For U.S. Law, see Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 427 Mass
509, 517 (1998); see also, F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815 (1st Cir. 1996); BURTON &
ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 330 (stating that ―American law imposes no general duty to
negotiate a contract in good faith‖). For U.K. law, see Banakas, supra note 16; see also,
Musy, supra note 16; Powell, supra note 21.
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property is not the subject matter of the plaintiff‘s claim.320 In this
particular situation, both parties agree that the ownership of land did not
switch hands. The issue relates to the legality of the defendant‘s behavior
during the negotiations of a contract. There is no reason to link this issue to
the subject matter of a contract that never came into existence. To hold
otherwise would require the seller of land to inquire about the law of every
state where he owns land for sale. While it might not seem like a heavy
burden whenever the sale of land constitutes a one-time occurrence, it might
seriously inconvenience realty companies that are based in one country but
own land in several others. It might also cause an inconvenience to the
defendant that specializes in multiple activities. For instance, a defendant
that sells land and offers construction services will have to behave
differently depending on the subject matter of the contract under
negotiation. Indeed, the applicable law to the defendant‘s precontractual
liability whenever the subject matter of the contract is the sale of land is the
law of the situs of the property, while the applicable law to precontractual
liability arising out of the negotiations of a construction contract is the law
of the habitual residence of the defendant. 321 Thus, the same potential
debtor might have to behave differently based on the subject matter of the
contract under negotiation. To put the burden of inquiring about the
contents of so many laws on the same defendant can prove to be excessive.
Fifth, the plaintiff has no right to rely on German law in order to get
compensation. According to U.K. law, which is the law of the plaintiff‘s
habitual residence and, arguably, the law where the injury has manifested
itself, he has no right to compensation. The plaintiff has no right to the
application of the law of a place where he does not own property and where
he does virtually no business. Thus, the application of the lex contractus in
negotio is completely inappropriate in this situation and should be
displaced. This last scenario presents a compelling argument in favor of the
displacement of the lex contractus in negotio.
(c) The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus In Negotio
That Is Determined on the Basis of the Escape Clause
Whenever the lex contractus in negotio is determined on the basis of
the escape clause provided by Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, it is the
law of the country that has the closest connection to the contract. 322 The
employment of the escape clause provided by Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation has two major flaws.
320
In this situation, the issue is the defendant‘s precontractual liability. Both parties have
agreed that the contract has not been concluded.
321
Article 4(1) b of the Rome I Regulation states that: ―a contract for the provision of
services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his
habitual residence.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1).
322
See supra Part II(A)(1).
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First, the employment of the escape clause requires the seised court to
search for the law of the country that has the closest connection to the
contract under negotiation, which does not necessarily coincide with the
country that has the closest connection to the non-contractual obligation
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract. Instead of
searching for the law of the country that has the closest connection to the
parties‘ precontractual relationship, courts will have to identify the law that
has the closest connection to a contemplated contract that never came into
existence. In effect, courts might disregard factors like the place of injury,
the place of conduct, and the place where the parties‘ precontractual
relationship is centered, in favor of irrelevant factors such as the place of
performance of the contemplated contract in order to determine the
applicable law to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo.
Second, the employment of the escape clause provided by Article 4 of
the Rome II Regulation reaches random results. While it might reach
favorable results in cases where the relevant contacts of both the contract
under negotiation and of the non-contractual obligation arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract coincide, it will most likely
produce inappropriate results whenever the respective relevant contacts are
divergent.
b. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Application of the Lex
Contractus in Negotio
While the application of the lex contractus in negotio has its
advantages, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation
has one major flaw: it lacks flexibility. Although, the European Legislature
has allowed the parties to displace the lex contractus in negotio,323 it has
failed to provide the courts with the necessary means to set aside its
application whenever it reaches inappropriate results.
i. The Advantages Of The Application Of The Lex Contractus In Negotio
Applying the law of the contract under negotiation to the liability that
arises out of precontractual dealings has three benefits. First, the
application of the lex contractus in negotio reduces the uncertainty that
accompanies the application of the lex delicti. Second, it helps avoid
unnecessary dépeçage. Third, it affords the weaker bargaining party with
the protection of a more protective law.
(1) Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Reduces the Uncertainty
that Accompanies the Application of the Lex Delicti
According to section 145 of the Second Restatement on Conflict of
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Laws, four contacts are usually relevant in torts cases: (1) the place of the
conduct; (2) the place of injury; (3) the place where the parties‘ relationship
is centered; and (4) the place of residence of the parties. 324 These contacts
are traditionally used in order to determine the lex delicti that governs a
non-contractual obligation. Where the case is one of precontractual
liability, the localization of the place of conduct, the place of injury and the
place where the relationship is centered becomes a tedious and complex
task that ruins the uniformity sought by the Legislature.325 Had the
Legislature chosen to submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to
the lex delicti, courts would be faced with the tedious task of locating the
various torts contacts. The application of the lex contractus in negotio in
cases of precontractual liability reduces the uncertainty that accompanies
the determination of such contacts, 326 and provides legal certainty to the
parties.327
(a) The Place of Conduct
In cases of precontractual liability, difficulties arise as to the
localization of the conduct that causes harm. This is the case, for example,
whenever liability arises out of the unjustified break off of negotiations
(Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction). In this case, the harmful conduct is
the break off of negotiations. The place of the decision to break off
negotiations is not easy to determine whenever this decision is made by the
defendant in one place and comes to the attention of the plaintiff in another.
In this case, it might be argued that the harmful conduct occurs in one of
three places: (1) the place where the defendant was first aware of his
intention not to continue the negotiations; 328 (2) the place where the
defendant has dispatched his decision to break off negotiations to the
plaintiff; or (3) the place where the plaintiff has become aware of the
defendant‘s decision. The same problem arises whenever liability arises out
of the revocation of the offer by the defendant (Example 2 of the
Introduction). In this case, the defendant‘s decision to revoke the offer
might have been contained in a letter that was dispatched in one place and
received in another, while the intention to mislead the other party might
have exteriorized in yet another forum. In such cases, application of the lex
contractus in negotio relieves the courts from the tedious task of locating
the place of conduct and helps achieve uniformity between the member
states.

324
325
326
327
328

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
See Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590.
See id.
Thoma, supra note 22, at 682.
See Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590.
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(b) The Place of Injury
The place of injury can be difficult to determine because of the type of
injury sustained by the plaintiff. 329 Culpa in contrahendo can cause two
types of injuries. First, culpa in contrahendo can cause an economic loss to
the plaintiff. The Rome II Regulation excludes physical harm from the
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 330 Thus, losses that usually
arise out of precontractual liability are, in most cases, purely economic. 331
The place where financial loss has occurred is difficult to locate and has not
been determined by the European Legislature. Case law in the Member
States does not provide a uniform solution. Courts have decided that
financial losses can occur in one of four places: (1) the place where the
decision to break off negotiations was received;332 (2) the place where the
contract under negotiation would have been performed had it been
concluded;333 (3) the place where the non-blameworthy party acted on the
other party‘s misstatements;334 or (4) the place where the victim has its
place of residence. 335
Second, the plaintiff might suffer harm to his reputation or to his
image as a result of the defendant‘s conduct. Localization of such interests
is equally problematic336 as the harm might be considered to have occurred
either at: (1) the place of residence of the plaintiff;337 (2) at the place where
the plaintiff‘s reputation might be abused;338 or (3) wherever the plaintiff
does business.339 Application of the lex contractus in negotio, allows courts
to bypass the preliminary step of locating the place of injury and helps
avoid complications in the determination of the applicable law that would
have, otherwise, ruined uniformity had the Legislature chosen to submit
claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex delicti.

329

See PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 739, Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590.
See supra Part I(B)(2)(a).
331
On the type of injury arising from precontractual liability, see W. H. VAN BOOM ET
AL., PURE ECONOMIC LOSS (2004); O. Deshayes, Le dommage précontractuel, RTD Com.
2004 187.
332
André Huet, Chronique de jurisprudence française, JDI 2003, 146, citing C.A.
Rennes, Bull. Joly 1993 463; J.-J. Daigre, JCP 1993 IV 1520.
333
Huet, supra note 332, at 146.
334
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 524.
335
See Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1999); Lang v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
336
See Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court
Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996).
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(c) The Place of the Parties’ Precontractual Relationship
Parties to a negotiation enter into a factual relationship defined by their
negotiations. The parties‘ precontractual relationship can be difficult to
determine whenever negotiations are conducted in the absence of the
physical presence of the parties: through the telephone, or via email. This is
especially true for the place of negotiation of the contract which can be hard
to identify whenever the parties did not meet at the precontractual stage.
The above-mentioned difficulties are resolved by the application of the
lex contractus in negotio.340 Indeed, the application of the law of the
contract under negotiation relieves courts from the burden of locating the
various tortious contacts in international negotiations and helps achieve
legal certainty through predictable and uniform results between the different
Member States.341
(2) Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Eliminates Incoherence
by Avoiding Dépeçage342
Application of the law of the contract under negotiation to claims of
precontractual liability helps eliminate incoherence by avoiding dépeçage.
According to D. Moura Vicente, ―when adjudicating a claim of
precontractual liability involving foreign elements, a court may face certain
incidental questions also affected by foreign elements, such as the existence
or the validity of an international contract.‖343
In some cases,
―compensation of damages arising out of culpa in contrahendo presupposes
that the contract was either invalid or had not yet come into existence.‖344
Issues relating to the existence or to the validity of the contract are,
according to Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation, governed by the law of
the contract if it were valid. 345 By submitting claims arising out of culpa in
contrahendo to the law of the contract under negotiation, the European
Legislature has in fact submitted all issues related to the contract under
negotiation to the same law. In effect, when a court is confronted with the
two issues it will rule on the existence (or on the validity) of the contract
and on the claim for damages by applying the same law. The application of
two different laws to both issues might lead to unacceptable results. This
340

Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590.
Cf. Thoma, supra note 22, at 682.
342
According to Black‘s Law Dictionary, dépecage designates ―a court‘s application of
different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue
basis.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (2009).
343
For a similar example, see Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718.
344
Id.
345
Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that: ―[t]he existence and validity of a
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it
under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008,
supra note 38, art. 10(1).
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would be the case for example, if the law designated to govern the issue of
precontractual liability considers that the contract under negotiation has
been concluded, and that the defendant is exonerated from precontractual
liability, while the law designated to govern the validity of the contract
states that the contract has not been formed, and holds the defendant
precontractually liable. 346 The implementation of dépeçage in this situation
thwarts the interests of both States whose laws are in conflict, as well as the
expectations of both parties. 347
(3) Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Affords Protection to the
Party in the Weaker Bargaining Position
The rule of Article 12(1) enables ―the application of the [favorable]
laws designated by Articles 6 and 8 of the Rome I Regulation‖.348 Because
the law of the contract under negotiation is to be determined pursuant to the
rules of the Rome I Regulation, ―the particular protection this instrument
provides to certain consumer and individual employment contracts similarly
extends to the precontractual bargaining period of the contract‖.349
According to B. Volders, ―the presumed economic weaker contracting
parties are accordingly granted legal protection also prior [to their] entering
into a final agreement.‖350 Such an outcome is in accordance with national
legislations that afford protection to the consumer or to the employee during
the precontractual period.
ii. The Inflexibility of the Rule Provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II
Regulation
In spite of its advantages, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the
Rome II Regulation lacks flexibility. The European Legislature did not
expressly provide for any escape devices in the event the application of the
lex contractus in negotio reaches inappropriate results.351 While the
European Legislature might have provided escape clauses in several
provisions of the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations, the Legislature did
not insert an escape clause in Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. The
Legislature‘s silence has led to the creation of a rigid rule, which lacks
flexibility. On one hand, the conceptual devices employed by American
346

See supra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i); see also Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718.
See supra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i); see also Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718.
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Thoma, supra note 22, at 682; see also Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at
467; DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 534.
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Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467.
350
Id.
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It should be noted that according to Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, the lex
contractus in negotio can be displaced by application of the mandatory provisions of the law
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courts in order to escape the egregious results of the First Restatement do
not work in EPIL; on the other hand, the three remaining escape
possibilities have to be borrowed from other provisions at the expense of a
manifest disregard to the express wording of the rules.
(1) The Inapplicability of American Escape Devices in EPIL
In order to escape the egregious results of the First Restatement‘s
vested rights theory, American courts mainly employ three conceptual
escape devices: (1) characterization; (2) renvoi; and (3) public policy.352
While these escape devices have had success in the United States, they
cannot be used in order to displace the lex contractus in negotio in EPIL.
(a) Characterization
In order to escape the rigid rule of the lex loci delicti, American courts
recharacterized ―the issue for decision, as a non-tort issue in order to use
another First Restatement rule and generate a better result.‖353 While
recharacterization might have yielded some good results in the United
States, it is highly unlikely that those same results can be reached in EPIL
where the category of culpa in contrahendo has an autonomous meaning.354
This autonomy has been bestowed upon culpa in contrahendo for the
specific purpose of putting an end to the characterization issue of this type
of liability in Europe.355 It is highly unlikely that a European court will be
able to recharacterize an issue of culpa in contrahendo, without any
intervention by the ECJ.
(b) Renvoi
American courts have used renvoi356 in order to apply the conflicts
rules of a foreign law designated by one of the conflicts rules of the forum.
Although application of renvoi has helped American courts escape some of
the rigid rules of the First Restatement, 357 its application is excluded by
Article 24 of the Rome II Regulation which states that ―the application of
the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the application of
the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private
352

RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 309, § 65.
Id.; see also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859 (1953) (where the court used the
substance/procedure distinction to recharacterize the issue); Haumschild v. Continental
Casualty Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (where the court recharacterized a torts issue into a
status issue and applied the law of the marital domicile).
354
See supra Part I(B).
355
See supra Part I(B).
356
Renvoi is defined as ―the doctrine under which a court in resorting to foreign law
adopts as well the foreign law‘s conflict-of-laws principles, which may in turn refer the court
back to the law of the forum.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (2009).
357
See Haumschild, 95 N.W.2d 814.
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international law.‖358 Furthermore, its application would be useless
whenever the foreign law designated by the Rome II Regulation is the law
of a member state that applies the conflict-of-law rule provided by Article
12 of the Rome II Regulation.
(c) Public Policy
The public policy exception is the only safeguard a Member State‘s
court can use in order to escape the rigid rule of Article 12(1) of the Rome
II Regulation. Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation states that ―the
application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this
Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.‖359 While
this article provides for the application of the public policy exception, it
also limits its application to cases where the applicable law is ―manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the forum.‖360 According to Recital
32 of the Rome II Regulation, ―considerations of public interest justify
giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, in exceptional
circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and
overriding mandatory provisions.‖361 In other words, the setting aside of
the applicable law for the violation of public policy of the forum is rare.
This is especially true in civil and commercial matters such as
precontractual liability. It follows that the regular safeguards employed by
American courts to counter the effects of the First Restatement do not have
the same prophylactic effects in EPIL.
(2) The Inapplicability of Borrowed Escape Devices
Because Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation does not expressly
provide escape devices, courts of Member States might be inclined to
borrow the escape devices provided by the European Legislature in other
dispositions. Specifically, courts might be inclined to borrow the escape
devices provided by the following three articles: Article 4(3) of the Rome I
Regulation; Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation; and Article 12(2) of the
Rome II Regulation.
(a) The Escape Clause Provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides an escape clause that is
applicable whenever the contract is, manifestly, more closely connected to
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360
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another country. 362 Although, this provision introduces flexibility, its
application is restricted to the determination of the applicable law to the
contract itself and cannot be used to determine the applicable law to the
parties‘ precontractual relationship.363 According to Article 4(3), ―where it
is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.‖364 The escape
clause provided by this Article allows courts to displace the law designated
by paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation only when the
contract itself is manifestly more closely connected with another country.
Such an escape device cannot be used to displace the law designated by the
afore-mentioned paragraphs whenever the non-contractual obligation
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract appears to be
more closely connected with another country. To hold otherwise, would go
against the wording of Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation, which clearly
states that courts base their analysis on the contract itself and not on the
parties‘ precontractual relationship.365
(b) The Rule Provided by Article 10(2) of The Rome I Regulation
Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation allows a party, in order to
determine that he did not consent to the formation of the contract, to rely
upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it
appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine
the effect of his conduct in accordance with the lex contractus, thus setting
aside the application of the law that would normally govern the contract.366
Although this provision was initially introduced to resolve the problem of
―the implications of silence by one party as to the formation of the
contract,‖367 recent scholarly writings have called for its application in order
to prevent unfair results in cases of precontractual liability. 368 According to
some authors, the application of this provision might be particularly
appropriate ―in order to provide an escape clause to the party who could not
reasonably expect to have his precontractual behavior regulated by a law
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Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art 4(3).
Lagarde, supra note 33, at 593, note 39.
364
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, at Article 4(3) (emphasis added).
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See id. art. 4(3).
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According to this article: ―[A] party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may
rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the
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accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1.‖ Id. art. 10(2).
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PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 422.
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Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; Thoma, supra note 22, at 682;
Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 547; Gautier, supra note 245, at 13; MAX PLANCK INST.,
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other than his.‖369 This would be the case, for example, whenever a
defendant has relied on the law of his residence that does not impose a
precontractual duty of good faith and fair dealings in order to put an end to
negotiations, which according to the lex contractus in negotio, he had no
right to break.370
While some scholars have argued for the application of this provision,
the fact remains that the wording of this provision prevents its application
to claims arising out of precontractual liability. 371 Indeed, Article 10(2) of
the Rome I Regulation affords protection to the party who has relied on the
law of his residence ―in order to establish that he did not consent.‖372 The
wording of this provision excludes its application whenever the party‘s aim
is to escape liability. We cannot assume that the Legislature intended to
extend the application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo.
On the contrary, it is precisely because the Legislature did not expressly
extend the application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo
that this possibility should not be open to the defendant. 373 Indeed, Article
10(2) of the Rome I Regulation was promulgated subsequently to Article 12
of the Rome II Regulation. Had the Legislature chosen to extend the
application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo he would
have followed the example set by the Proposal of the Max Planck Institute
for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
and inserted an express provision authorizing the defendant to ―rely upon
the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence to establish
that [. . .] he was under no obligation arising from the negotiations.‖374
Therefore, we cannot allow courts of member states to displace the lex
contractus in negotio on the basis of Article 10(2) of the Rome I
Regulation.375
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Thoma, supra note 22, at 683.
For examples of this situation, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467;
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(c) The Escape Clause Provided by Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II
Regulation
Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II Regulation provides an escape clause
that is applicable whenever it is clear from all the circumstances of the case
that the non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the
conclusion of a contract is manifestly more closely connected with a
country other than the country designated by paragraph 2 of this
provision.376 Although this provision seems to provide an appropriate
escape clause, its applicability is extremely limited.
First, its applicability is limited to situations where the applicable law
is determined according to the rules of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation. According to Article 12(2)(c), ―where it is clear from
all the circumstances of the case that the non-contractual obligation arising
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract is manifestly more
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in points (a) and
(b), the law of that other country.‖377 It follows that this escape clause is
not applicable whenever the law that governs culpa in contrahendo is
determined according to paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation.
Second, its application is only possible whenever ―the law applicable
cannot be determined on the basis of paragraph 1.‖378 This escape clause is
only applicable whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be
determined and not when the lex contractus in negotio appears to be loosely
connected to the issue. This escape clause cannot be used to displace the
lex contractus in negotio whenever it reaches inappropriate results.379 To
hold otherwise would go against the wording of Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation.
The lack of escape devices provided by the Legislature leads to the
quasi-exclusive application of the lex contractus in negotio, which can
rarely be displaced.380 This quasi-exclusivity is further comforted by the
limited applicability of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
B. The Subsidiary Application of the Laws Enumerated by Article 12(2) of
the Rome II Regulation
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides subsidiary rules that
are applicable whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be
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determined.381 While this provision deviates from the application of the lex
contractus in negotio, its application will, according to B. Volders, ―most
probably prove superfluous in practice.‖382
This conclusion seems
reasonable in light of the application requirement of Article 12(2) of the
Rome II Regulation. Because the lex contractus in negotio can, in the vast
majority of cases, be identified, the subsidiary rules provided by paragraph
2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation will rarely apply.
1. The Structure of Article 12(2)
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides three different rules
that apply ―disjunctively.‖383 Unlike Articles 10 and 11 of the Rome II
Regulation with which it is usually associated,384 Article 12(2) ―does not
establish a clear hierarchy of its provisions inter se.‖385 Because the three
rules are joined by the coordinating conjunction ―or,‖386 a literal
interpretation of this provision gives courts a wide discretion as to the
choice of the relevant connecting factor. Indeed, the three rules apply
alternatively. Courts have the possibility to apply the law of the place of
injury, the law of the common residence of the parties, or the escape clause
whenever the two previous contacts seem inappropriate.
a. The Application of the Law of the Place of Injury
Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome II Regulation provides for the application
of ―the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irrespective of the
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences
of that event occurred.‖387 According to this provision, the law of the place
of injury governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability. By inserting this
provision, the European Legislature has in fact submitted culpa in
contrahendo to the general rule applicable to torts claims, which is provided
by Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation.388 The application of the law of the
place of injury is consistent with the non-contractual characterization of
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation.389 The law of the place of
381
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injury is the normal lex delicti applicable to non-contractual obligations.
However, this return to normalcy can only occur whenever the lex
contractus in negotio cannot be determined.390
The rule provided by Article 12 (2) (a) incurs two criticisms. First, the
place of injury is usually difficult to determine in cases of precontractual
liability.391 Although this rule provides for the application of the law of the
place of injury ―irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect
consequences of that event occurred,‖392 this precision does not help avoid
the difficulty of locating the place of injury. 393
Second, application of the lex loci damni disregards other relevant
contacts like the place of the conduct or the place of residence of the parties
and might lead to unfair results which American courts have long sought to
avoid.394 However, this unwanted result can be avoided because Article
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides flexibility and allows the
application of another law whenever application of the lex loci damni
reaches inappropriate results.
b. The Application of the Law of the Parties‘ Common Residence
Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome II Regulation states that ―where the
parties have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when
the event giving rise to the damage occurs, the law of that country‖395
should govern the defendant‘s precontractual liability. According to this
provision, the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability is the
law of the common residence of the parties at the time of the conduct.396
This law would still apply whenever the parties have changed residences
between the time when culpa in contrahendo arose and the time when the
injury has manifested itself.
The Legislature has chosen as a relevant date for a habitual residence
the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs. This provision
deviates from the general rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome II
Regulation, which requires that all parties have their habitual residence in
the same country at the time when the damage occurs.397

Part I.
390

And the parties did not have their habitual residence in the same country at the time of
conduct. See infra Part II(B)(2).
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It is unclear why the Legislature has chosen to depart from the general
rule he has established in Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. 398 This
change in the wording of Article 12(2)(b) does not address the difficulty of
determining the relevant contacts in cases of culpa in contrahendo. While it
is true that it is difficult to determine the exact time of injury in cases of
precontractual liability, 399 ―it is, however, wrong to assume that the exact
time of the event giving rise to the damage is easier to determine.‖400
However, it may be argued that this rule reaches more suitable results
than the rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation whenever
the parties have changed residences between the time when the event giving
rise to the damage has occurred and the time when the injury has
manifested itself. This is especially true whenever the law of the habitual
place of residence at the time of conduct is more favorable to the party who
has moved out between the time when the event giving raise to the damage
occurs and the time when the injury arises, than the law of his place of
residence at the time of injury. In this particular scenario, the party that has
moved out of the state of the habitual residence has a right to rely on this
law‘s provisions, while the other party has no right to rely on the more
favorable law of a state whose application he could not foresee at the time
of conduct. The parties are expected to have relied on the law of their
common residence at the time they enter into negotiations. Although an
argument can be made as to the suitability of this rule, we cannot assume it
reaches appropriate results every time the parties have a common habitual
place of residence at the time of conduct. This is why the European
Legislature has provided an escape clause in Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II
Regulation.
c. The Escape Clause
Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II Regulation provides an escape clause
whenever the applicable law according to Articles 12(2)(a) and 12(2)(b) of
the Rome II Regulation is inappropriate. According to Article 12(2)(c)
where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the noncontractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion
of a contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country
other than that indicated in points (a) and (b), the law of that other
country [should apply].401

This text allows for the determination of the applicable law on an ad hoc
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basis each time the applicable law according to the previous two provisions
of Article 12(2) is inappropriate. 402 The escape clause provided by Article
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation is worded in similar fashion to the escape
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 403 As such, it is
subject to the same type of criticism: namely, that ―it entails the risk of
degenerating into a mechanical counting of physical contacts.‖404 However,
―this risk is reduced when the escape is correlated to the overarching
principles that permeate the rules, and/or when the escape allows an issueby-issue evaluation.‖405 It would seem that the wording of this provision
allows for such an optimal employment of the escape clause. However,
although this escape clause helps bring flexibility to the rigid rules of
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation, its application can prove to be
relatively rare in practice.
2. The Application Requirement of Article 12(2)
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation is only applicable whenever
the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability cannot be
determined on the basis of Article 12(1) of the same Regulation. By
inserting a second paragraph in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, the
Legislature did not intend to provide courts with an escape device that
allows the application of a more appropriate rule whenever the lex
contractus in negotio leads to unwanted results. Article 12(2) of the Rome
II Regulation serves as an alternative whenever it is impossible to determine
the lex contractus in negotio on the basis of Article 12(1). In effect, courts
are not allowed to use the escape clause provided by Article 12(2)(c) in
order to displace the application of the lex contractus in negotio whenever it
can be determined.406
―The circumstances in which the law cannot be determined in
accordance Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation are not addressed in the
provision‖.407 The Legislature‘s silence might prove to be a source of
disruption as it might reintroduce diversity where the Legislature has sought
to achieve uniformity. The application of this provision might entirely
depend on the inclination of the judge dealing with a liability claim arising
out of culpa in contrahendo. A court that favors the rule of Article 12(1) of
the Rome II Regulation will likely find sufficiently determined contacts in a
situation where another court, which favors the application of Article 12(2)
of the same Regulation, would find them insufficient.
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Additionally, it would seem that the law that governs the defendant‘s
precontractual liability can, in the vast majority of cases, be determined on
the basis of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation, thus rendering the
second paragraph of the same Article rarely applicable. 408
On one hand, whenever culpa in contrahendo has not prevented the
formation of the contract,409 the law of the contract under negotiation is the
lex contractus finalis which is, in the vast majority of cases, always
determinable.410 The concluded contract either contains a choice of law
clause or allows the determination of the relevant contacts provided by
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 411 Even in situations where the
applicable law cannot be determined on the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2)
of the Rome I Regulation, courts can, in the vast majority of cases,
determine the lex contractus finalis on the basis of the escape clause
provided by Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation. 412 However, an issue
might arise whenever the parties have decided to submit different parts of
the contract to different laws. 413 It might be argued that in such a case the
lex contractus finalis cannot be determined on the basis of Article 12(1) of
the Rome II Regulation and that the defendant‘s precontractual liability is
governed by one of the laws enumerated by Article 12(2) of the Rome II
Regulation.414
On the other hand, whenever culpa in contrahendo has prevented the
formation of the contract under negotiation,415 the lex contractus putativus
is determinable on the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I
Regulation, or on the basis of Article 4(4) of the same Regulation.416
First, the lex contractus putativus is, in most cases, determinable on
the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 417 Indeed,
whenever parties enter into a negotiation, three contacts are already
determined: both parties‘ places of residence and the subject matter of the
contract. In most cases, this information helps determine the place of the
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance, whose
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law is usually applicable to the contemplated contract. 418 It should be noted,
however, that some scholars have argued that a ―breakdown of negotiations
at the very beginning [might] hinder the determination of the applicable law
to the projected agreement, especially if the projected agreement were to be
very complex.‖419 This might be the case, for example, in complex mergers
where the debtor of the characteristic performance of the projected merger
cannot be accurately determined at the start of negotiations. 420
Alternatively, and even if the lex contractus putativus cannot be
determined on the basis of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation, this law can be determined on the basis of Article 4(4) of the
same Regulation. 421 Indeed, Article 4(4) provides the courts with a
subsidiary rule that allows the application of the law with the closest
connection to the contract whenever the rules provided by the previous
paragraphs do not allow the determination of the applicable law. 422 By
employment of this escape clause, a court will be able to force the
localization of the country with the closest connection to the putative
contract. In effect, the lex contractus in negotio is, in the vast majority of
cases, determinable through the application of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation.423
Whatever view is taken as to the determination of the lex contractus in
negotio, it all depends on whether the courts will be willing to displace the
rule of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. A court that favors the rule
of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation will likely find sufficiently
determined contacts in a situation where another court, which favors the
application of Article 12(2) of the same Regulation, would find them
insufficient.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it would seem that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation
will have mitigated success. This essay has tried to show the positives as
well as the negatives of the Legislature‘s attempt at codification.
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A. The Positives
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches two positive results.
First, this provision has succeeded in reaching a uniform characterization of
culpa in contrahendo in EPIL. Although the issue of the applicable law to
the precontractual liability arising out of the breach of a contractual
obligation remains unresolved, the contours of the category of culpa in
contrahendo in EPIL are determined without regard to national
characterization.
Second, the Legislature‘s choice to submit claims arising out of culpa
in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio is laudable. The application
of this law reduces the uncertainty that accompanies the application of the
lex delicti in a situation involving precontractual liability. Furthermore, it
avoids unwanted results whenever the validity of the contract under
negotiations affects the defendant‘s precontractual liability.
B. The Negatives
The European Legislature‘s attempt at codification of a choice of law
rule on culpa in contrahendo reaches six negative results.
First, the Legislature‘s use of vague concepts, such as ―non-contractual
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ and
―non-contractual obligations presenting a direct link with the dealings prior
to the conclusion of a contract,‖ in order to define the material scope of
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation are likely to reintroduce diversity
where the Legislature has sought to achieve uniformity. In effect, courts of
Member States will likely interpret these concepts according to national
laws, which will ruin the uniformity achieved at the legislation stage.
Second, the Legislature did not provide guidelines as to the applicable
law to precontractual liability that arises out of the breach of a contractual
obligation. The Legislature‘s silence might prove to be a source of
confusion whenever a Member State‘s court is confronted with a claim
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement.
Third, the application of the lex contractus in negotio has ruined the
uniformity between the European Regulations on Private International Law
reached by the Legislature at the characterization stage. Indeed, culpa in
contrahendo is characterized in EPIL as non-contractual for the purposes of
choice of law and of choice of jurisdiction. However, the Brussels I
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters does not provide a special rule
for the choice of jurisdiction in matters relating to culpa in contrahendo.424
Therefore, the competent jurisdiction in a case of culpa in contrahendo is
determined according to the tortious contacts provided by Article 5(3) of

424

536

Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 84.

Culpa in Contrahendo in European Private International Law
32:451 (2012)

the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the court, whose jurisdiction is established
on the basis of a non-contractual connecting factor, will have to apply a law
that is determined on the basis of a contractual connecting factor, which
does not always coincide with the law of the forum.
Fourth, the determination of the lex contractus in negotio might prove
to be a delicate issue. This is especially true whenever the parties have
chosen to submit different parts of their concluded contract to different
laws.
Complications may also arise whenever the contract under
negotiation has not been concluded. In this situation, the determination of
the applicable law hinges on the contacts provided by the parties‘
contractual project which might create additional problems as to the proof
of the contents of such a project.
Fifth, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation
lacks flexibility. The lack of escape devices in Article 12 of the Rome II
Regulation make for a rigid rule that might be inappropriate in certain
situations.
Sixth, paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only
applies whenever the applicable law cannot be determined on the basis of
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. However, the Legislature did not
provide a list of circumstances in which the law cannot be determined on
the basis of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. The Legislature‘s
silence might reintroduce diversity where the Legislature has aimed for
uniformity. The application of this provision will most likely depend on the
inclination of each court. Moreover, it would appear that, in the vast
majority of cases, the lex contractus in negotio can be determined, thus
rendering the application of Article 12(2) relatively rare in practice.
The positive as well as the negative results that stem from the
application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation are better illustrated by
its application to the examples mentioned in the introduction. 425
Example 1: In this example, the contract has already been concluded,
thus the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability is governed by the
lex contractus finalis. In this case, the parties did not include in their
contract a choice of law clause. Therefore, the lex contractus finalis is to be
determined according to Article 4(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 426 The
defendant‘s precontractual liability is governed by U.S. law, which is the
law of the habitual residence of the seller.427
In this situation, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches a
positive result. Indeed, the United States have a strong interest in
protecting its residents from liability arising out of the failure to disclose
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during the negotiations of a contract. It also has an interest in liberating the
parties‘ conduct at the negotiation stage in order to encourage commercial
initiatives. It is also the law of the debtor of the characteristic performance
whose application is, arguably, foreseeable to the plaintiff. In addition, this
situation raises the issue of the validity of the concluded contract, in which
case the application of the lex contractus in negotio reaches favorable
results.
Example 2: In this example, there are two issues that need to be
addressed. The first issue is the existence of the contract. According to
Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, ―the existence and validity of a
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which
would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖428
It follows that the law that governs the existence of the contract is
determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is the law
of the habitual residence of the seller of shares. It follows that the existence
of the contract is governed by French law, which considers that the
revocation of the offer prevents the formation of the contract. 429 The second
issue is the defendant‘s precontractual liability. Because the applicable law
to the existence of the contract considers that the revocation of the offer has
prevented the formation of the contract, the defendant‘s precontractual
liability is to be governed by the lex contractus putativus. This law is also
determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is the law
of the habitual residence of the seller of shares. It follows that the issue of
defendant‘s precontractual liability is also governed by French law, which
does not allow the defendant to freely revoke his offer without incurring
liability.430
In this example, the issues of the existence of the contract and of the
defendant‘s precontractual liability are intertwined. Application of Article
12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches a positive result by submitting the
two issues to the same law, and avoids unnecessary dépeçage in order to
achieve a coherent result. 431
Example 3: In this example, the contract for the sale of goods has not
been concluded, thus, the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability is
to be governed by the lex contractus putativus, which is the law of the
habitual residence of the seller. Application of the rule provided by Article
12(1) of the Rome II Regulation leads to the application of French law to
the defendant‘s precontractual liability. This result has mitigated success.
While it may be argued that the lex contractus in negotio is appropriate in
order to resolve a true conflict situation, one may argue that the application
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of French law in this situation is ―neither fair nor efficient as it creates legal
obstacles to the initiative of the parties to engage in contractual
negotiations.‖432
Example 4: In this example, the contract for the sale of land has not
been concluded. Thus, the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability
is to be governed by the lex contractus putativus. Because the parties‘
contemplated contract is a contract for the sale of land, this law is
determined on the basis of Article 4(1)(c) of the Rome I Regulation and is
the ―law of the country where the property is situated.‖433 Thus, according
to German law, the defendant is liable for breaking off the negotiations in
bad faith.434
The result reached by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation is
inappropriate and should be avoided.435 However, Article 12 of the Rome
II Regulation does not expressly provide the courts with appropriate escape
devices that would allow them to displace the lex contractus in negotio in
order to reach more appropriate results.
In light of this appraisal, it would seem appropriate to suggest that the
Commission‘s report on the application of the Rome II Regulation,
scheduled to be submitted to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee in 2012, include the following:
i. A definition of the concept of non-contractual obligations, in
general, and more specifically, a definition of the concept of noncontractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion
of a contract;
ii. The determination of the material scope of Article 12 of the
Rome II Regulation. The Commission‘s report should address, in
particular, the issue of the applicable law to preliminary agreements
and pollicitation;
iii. The circumstances in which the lex contractus in negotio cannot
be determined, which would trigger the application of Article 12(2)
of the Rome II Regulation; and
iv. The proposal to include an escape clause that allows the courts to
displace the lex contractus in negotio whenever its application
reaches inappropriate results. It should be noted that the inclusion of
an escape clause in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not
contradict the Legislature‘s aim of achieving uniformity between the
different member states. Likewise, the need for legal certainty does
not justify the lack of an escape clause in Article 12(1) of the Rome
432
433
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II Regulation. Indeed, the European Legislature has inserted escape
clauses in several provisions of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations
in order to introduce flexibility and allow ―the court seized to treat
individual cases in an appropriate manner.‖436 No reason should
preclude the Legislature from providing an appropriate escape clause
that allows departure from the application of the lex contractus in
negotio.

While it can be presumptuous to hope that all the issues addressed in
the present essay will be resolved by the end of 2012, we hope that the
Commission‘s report will at least identify the most glaring shortcomings of
the rule provided by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
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